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AJENDRA PRASAD

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EDITORIAL NOTE

Due to circumstances beyond our control and especially due to the unavailability of a suitable letter printing press in Pune, we regret that the July-September 1986 issue could not be published on the due date of its publication affecting also the subsequent publication schedule of the October-December 1986 issue. Under the circumstances, and to maintain further periodicity intact, we have decided to bring out a combined number consisting of July-September and October-December 1986 issues. We request our Subscribers, Contributors and Readers to bear with us for a while and assure them to resume a regular publication schedule as soon as the present difficulties which we are facing are over.

Readers may note a change in our usual printing format. Due to the limitations of the new process, all italicized words appear as underlined words.

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CHANGE OF SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Inspite of steep rise in the production and postage costs we have not increased the current Subscription rates which are in operation from October 1980. During the last six years we have tried our best to meet the expenditure within the available resources including the present subscription rates. However, the continuous increase in the production and postage costs have forced us to revise the subscription rates as under :

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We are grateful to our subscribers for their unfailing and generous support. But for this patronage, we could never have been able to run effectively a research journal in the area of Philosophy under the conditions which pose several difficulties in undertaking such an enterprise. We hope our readers and subscribers will appriciate our decision to increase the subscription rates.

These revised rates will come in force from the 1st of January 1987.

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MAN - THE INCOMPLETE BEING.

It would perhaps be agreed that the proverb 'To err is human' does not mean that man establishes his human identity by committing mistakes. This proverb rather means that committing mistakes is in no way inconsistent with being human. To be sure, the proverb betokens one basic dimension of man's being - his fallibility. Man is a being who does commit mistakes and hence it seems prudent on his part not to claim the unshakable kind of certainty with regard to what he at any given time finds reasonable to acknowledge. The intent is not that man is a systematically erring being. Neither that man should always be in the state of doubt or inconfidence about what he at a given time achieves. Whenever man acknowledge something as the case, he does so usually upon reasons or evidence, and to that extent he must put reliance upon that. And since in order to take a stand on an issue or to ascertain something man cannot wait for the date when all the reasons for justifying his stand are available to him, he has to justify any such case by the up-to-date reasons. But he must always remain prepared that what he now finds reliable may turn out unreliable, that what he now achieves or accepts to be the case may eventually become modified or even cancelled. It goes without saying that man must try to find out procedures of knowing that would diminish the risk of error, which he never, however, can eradicate altogether. True, until any ground is found for doubting or denying what man already achieves, he must go by his such achievements. Thus it is not that, what would be nonsense to say, everything man achieves is false, that everywhere man is mistaken, so that whatever man achieves or acknowledges is to be refuted. The point is rather that whatever man achieves or acknowledges is open to be modified or

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refuted, i.e. that he might commit an error at some step in concluding what he now concludes as true.*

A claim is sometimes made that a judgment, if 'really' true, is always true; if a mistake is discovered, it was never 'really' true. But one might here ask, whether man could ever be in a position to declare that the judgements that he now (at any given time) proclaims are 'really' true, thereby being utterly immune from the possibility of being modified or even rejected at some future time. The crucial point is not whether or not a judgement is unshakably true, but whether man himself can at any given time proclaim judgements in a manner implying that he has said the last word. It is in the domain of the latter that fallibility is placed. Put differently, fallibility is essentially a matter of epistemology, not of ontology, if any such distinction be ultimately drawn in the human discourse.

Fallibility as a human phenomenon is not without significance. By making room for reconsideration of whatever man now takes for granted and also by forbidding the attitude that the task has been completed once and for all, fallibility teaches man not to remain 'satisfied' with, thereby addressing him to become critical of, what he already achieves. Fallibility thus is the very condition to impel man to raise new questions, to become (as Husserl speaks of the philosopher) a 'perpetual beginner'. In this sense fallibility constitutes one very important root of human creativity. In this sense, again, fallibility may be rgarded as another name for the openness of human knowledge; it (fallibility) does not cripple man's effort to know, but, on the contrary, because of openness, drives him to strive further in his journey of knowing. Man's fallibility in this way

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* Here of course we are speaking of discoverable error and not of undiscoverable error which cannot in principle be detected by anyone.

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reminds him that on his journey of knowing (as the famous proverb puts it) it is better to travel than to arrive, traveling being a kind of constant arriving.

To anyone who would be insisting that nothing subject to correction should ever be called to be known, the only rejoinder we could rather helplessly make is that, in that case, it would be extremely difficult, perhaps never possible, to claim on man's part - fallible as he is - any such immutable the 'Truth'. The urge to get hold of final 'knowledge' has often been acute enough to give rise to attempts to show that the quest of 'knowledge' terminates at knowing the basic laws of nature or of logic or of thought, or such a fundamental principle as the principle of sufficient reason, from any of which alone all the rest could (allegedly) be derived. Some thinkers have tried their hands at teleological explanations, arguing that knowledge of some 'basic' goals to the fulfilment of which all the rest are means, would give us all that this there to be known. Failure of these attempts reveals the futility of the finalist view of knowledge. In face of the ups and downs of human knowledge, it is plausible to suggest that it would be on man's part quite pointless and waste of time to wonder whether there is any final 'knowledge'. If, however, anyone like R.I. Aaron[1] speaks of 'infallible knowledge' as a mere 'ideal' never admittedly attainable at human level, we have nothing important to say against him, as we are presently concerned with knowledge in the actual discourse. And we find really no reason to say that what involves the possibility of error goes necessarily against the concept of knowledge we are familiar with. We are of course not claiming, as is already intimated that whatever man knows is not true, but, that it is open to further investigation which eventually might lead to its modification or cancellation. Not that, thus, the false propositions can be said to be known. Rather, if a proposition is regarded

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as known, it is to be regarded as ture too. But we find no impelling reason to impose the 'crucial' condition that if a proposition is regarded as known, it should ever be impossible in principle to question it.[2] At the human level knowledge can hardly be said to be in principle free of the risk of error. We must not, to repeat, confuse between 'I am in error' and 'what I claim to know is open to be questioned.' The risk of error encompasses the latter. A few lines from J.L.Evans might help us : " 'Being right' is, of course, part of what is involved in saying that someone knows something. But 'being right', though incompatible with 'actually being wrong', is not restricted in its application to situations where the risk of error is necessarily excluded. 'Being right...-means 'is right, but could have been wrong', not 'is right and could not have been wrong."[3] To be sure, there is no occasion for regret for not having the so-called unassailable 'knowledge'. No such 'knowledge' could at all be vouched for; hence not having it does not amount to being deprived of anything. On the contrary, it should be instructive to recognise that the need of being alive in any human persuit to the possibility of future correction without of course being lunatically haunted by it, has a vital pragmatic aspect. Because, in all likelihood, by taking himsself to be in possession of 'the final truth', man would become dogmatic, intolerant and fanatical, and what is more, he would cease to make further enquiry on that point, which would clearly cramp his creativity.

In any case, fallibility is something that is inherent in human nature itself, and so, human existence, rather, cannot bypass or deny it. One basic root of man's being a fallible creature seems to be his being a reflective being. Man recognises whatever he takes to be the case, primarily in terms of his reflectivity in that it is his 'reflective grasp' of his encounters that ultimately determines the 'meaning'

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of the world which is of any account to him. Now human reflectivity being essentially dynamic and hence potentially inexhaustible cannot accommodate any final horizon. As a reflective being, man is essentially a source of further 'interpretations' of his encounters, for which the 'future', for man, can never be completely seized upon. No mode of man's reflectivity could ever be said to swallow up all its possible forms of expression, not because it is too complex to be fully described, but because there can be no concluding limit to what it can make of itself. Man's reflective nature in this way does not simply allow him to enjoy any eternal perspective. This makes man essentially unable to give any of his 'acknowledgements' a final form and foundation. His fallibility being an ex-posing characteristic of his own nature, man can never escape it but has to face and fight it; it is precisely the fallibility of his being which makes him an ever unfinished creature.

Man's fallibility immediately begets his finitude. A fallible creature is essentially bereft of omniscience. An omniscient being could not commit mistakes and hence need not question himself or his achievements. Being essentially denied of omniscience, man needs this sort of questioning. Man's manner of questioning and the methods of his enquiry do not, however, as history reveals, remain the same. To give just one example: as regards man's enquiry into nature, the original question that was asked was: What is a thing? What is its essence? And the method in order to establish the essence of a thing was that of the analytic judgement. But this question later (in roughly the 16th and 17th centuries) began to be replaced by the question: How does a thing function? And the method in order to establish the function of a thing came to be that of the synthetic judgement.[4] Anyway man thus is able to detach himself from and question whatever he encounters.

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And by questioning himself and his attainments, man reveals his finitude.

The very nature of human existence is expressive of finitude. The individual existence of each of us is enclosed between two limits: birth and death. Each man is born and hence begins to exist of this time, this place, of these parents, in this type of society, and so on. But my finitude is most starkly revealed in my death. My death is an essential aspect of my being in that my whole being is in constant and real possibility of encountering it. Death does not come by appointment, and what is more, it may occur - really occur - at any time - may be just now! It is true, as Sartre reminds us, that my death cannot be a given item in the field of my experience and hence is not observable to me. Wittgenstein echoes this when he declares: '(My) Death is not an event in (my) life: we (I) do not live to experience (my) death.'[5] All this is true. My death is never a given item in my experience. But what is important to note is that this does not prevent me from visualising my death. I witness the death of other human beings and in this way come to realise what it means for a man to die. Thus emerges the meaning of my death to my awareness. I become aware that I shall die. Talk of 'inductive doubt' would be nonsense here. Now to become aware that I shall die is immediately to recognise a limit or boundary -- the boundary which I can in no way overstep - of my existance.

Often it is the case that the awareness that I shall die (henceforth death-awareness) implying an inevitable and final cessation of whatever I am and could become, begets in me a somewhat paralytic attitude of considering myself as an already lost being. This is no wonder. The thought that the world with all other inhabitants would continue to exist as usual but I shall not be there may well create in me a feeling of emptiness. In truth, death terrorises us

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not so much because we think it painful, but more because we cannot stand the idea of losing ourselves permanently. Miguel de Unamuno once reports in writing that 'as a youth and even as a child, I remained unmoved when shown the most moving pictures of hell, for even then nothing appeared to me quite so much horrible as nothingness itself.[6] But precisely because man knows what death means to him, the need of his coming to terms with it is pressing. It might be interesting to note that my death-awareness as an inescapable and final end of myself, may itself instill in me an urge to become creative. The awareness that I shall not continue to live for ever, that my existence has a definite termination which is the final negation of all my possibilities, may well incite me to go all out to realise my potentialities. As both Heidegger and Sartre recognise, death-awareness gives to life a sense of urgency that it would otherwise lack. And Freud once compared life without death-awareness to game played without stakes.[7] Seen from this perspective, death-awareness may be said to 'hand over' (to use a phrase of Heidegger) me to myself, thereby helping me to turn toward myself now in the most fruitful manner. In this way, death-awareness may well shatter all stagnation and become one most vital determinant of creativity. It is perhaps this aspect, among other ones, of death that Heidegger wants to emphasise when he says: 'It (death) does not come at the end of my life; it is present in every act of my life, in the very act of living.'[8]

Man's embodiedness is another expression of his finitude. It is clear that in order to be inserted and participate in the world, one is to be embodied. To be in the world is to be embodied, or (as Marcel puts it) to be incarnate. But as an embodied being man immediately becomes a finite being. As Marvin Farber observes: '... the question of human finitude is bound up with the fate of the human organism[9]

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This is mainly because my body provides me, at any given time, only a particular space-position to occupy (though I can move from one such space-position to another) and hence one specific view-point. This clearly limits me in having and exercising my point of view at any given time. Always I have and can have a particular point of view whence alone the world then is ordered for and offered to me, thereby putting limits to what I can encounter and grasp. In this way my bodily existence determines and limits the modes of involving myself in the world. By the same token, and especially in terms of my bodily condition; I become further limited in executing my programmes, in effecting my potentialities. Stated differently, my embodiedness limits the horizons into which I can project myself, or, to state in more simple words, limits me as regards what I can do and become.

My bodily existence, then, may be said to form one basic dimension of my situationality. My situationality, however, is not constituted only by my bodily existence. Two other important aspects of it are : (1) the 'structure of being' that I inherit; and (2) the socio-cultural-cum-linguistic 'framework' in which I am born and brought up. There are, thus, on the one hand, certain 'features' that are implanted in my being by my ancestors and more directly by my parents. On the other hand, there already prevails a 'system of values', shaped and hallowed by the thoughts of my predecessors and contemporaries, in which system I come to exist and am initially nurtured. These two, taken together, may be regarded as constituting my primary 'form of life'. In virtue of the influence of this 'form of life', certain limits are simply there in my being from its very inception--and it is not just possible for me to begin before the beginning.

Besides this 'form of life', my existence faces another kind of situation, namely, the actual state

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of affairs, I am at any given time placed in. This situation, too, limits my activities in various ways. Clearly, while acting on possibilities, I have to choose, in face of the situation I am then placed in, one alternative to the exclusion of others, and what is more, only a limited number of alternatives would be available to me at any given time. Furthermore my situation puts limits to the possible ways of realising my potentialities. I cannot, because of the nature of the particular situation I am in, sensibly venture whatever I wish. I must take note of myself vis-a-vis my situation, and project my possibilites accordingly. My possibilities are never free-floating ones, but are always set and become realistic ones from within a given situation. Not that the limits of a situation are dead-ends to which I must succumb and which I never can fight and transcard. Were that so, my existence would become an utterly closed one and the whole point of my projecting myself would be lost. The limits encountered by me in a given situation may be termed as 'frontiers' which I cannot simply refuse to take into account while projecting myself in that situation, otherwise my whole programme might well become a sheer fancy. The intent, however, is not to suggest that I could, in the process of transcending the frontiers of the given situation, someday place or find myself outside all sorts of frontiers - i.e. outside any situation whatsoever. If I succeed in overcoming or fighting out the frontiers of this situation, it is only to find myself in another with some other frontiers thereof.

To see man as finite and incomplete is not, it must be kept in mind, to dispossess him of his freedom. On the contrary, one might observe, man's finitude makes his freedom not only necessary but significant too. It is obvious that, for the Infinite nothing remains unrealised; nothing, that is, for Him could be considered to be a possibility. But as a finite being, man surely needs project possibilities, and this needs him to be a free being. Freedom

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provides him the very condition of his actions in that it is through the exercise of freedom that man can strive to achieve anything at all. In the context of action, man's freedom ultimately amounts to his ability to choose one particular course of action out of a limited number of alternatives. Unless in this way there exists a set of 'real alternatives' in a given situation, one would hardly understand what he, as a free being, is really asked for. Furthermore, to save freedom from being futile and vacuous, man must not go into the programme of achieving any the-type of 'perfect state of being'. Any such state is not simply admissible into the arena of human existence. There are, as is already pointed out, various sorts of limitations that man can never completely eschew. Furthermore, as we have also tried to show, for man, to transcend one set of limitations means to be placed in another set of limitations - there being no terminal point. So to conceive of freedom, in the human context, as pathway toward any absolute or perfect tranquility would be to go against the very nature of human existence and for that matter run into fiasco. And it would be instructive to note that it is in terms of his freedom itself that man cannot lie frozen into any given state of his being and existence. The awareness of himself as a free being, i.e. as a being who can project possibilities, immediately leads man to the awareness that any given state has its boundaries meant to be transcended. In this way, in the very awareness of freedom man recognises himself as finite and incomplete. 'Man's freedom is inseparable from his consciousness of his finite nature'.[10]

The germ of this incompleteness lies in man himself. First, as we have already noted, there is the ever-open reflective aspect of man for which man himself can never guarantee any level of existence as the final one, each level, however 'satisfactory' it might appear, being subject to further questioning

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and hence open to be transcended. To believe in change sometimes appears 'discomforting', but it (change) is rather logically inevitable inasmuch as man is consciously alive. Along with this reflective aspect, man's being contains a psychological side viz. desire, which too does not allow him to remain static. As a desiring being, man is invariably lured toward a 'more satisfactory' state of being and existence - a beyond. Desire is itself related to scarcity. I desire betokens I lack, and the grasp of desire is always greater than its reach. For this, man continuously tends to create new needs and is never sated. In the act of desiring man thus constitutes himself an incomplete being. Seen in terms of his reflective and desiring aspects, it is human nature itself 'which prevents him from feeling at home in any fixed pattern of life or framework of ideas, no matter how comprehensive or coherent it may be.'[11]

The difficulty of vindicating for man any fixed absolute kind of 'System' or 'Level' seems to have another root -- man's essential inability to predict his future with exactitude. The course of human existence is, it might be agreed, influenced by the nature and growth of human knowledge. But the history of human knowledge appears to be the story of the rise and fall of 'truths' and 'meanings'. This makes it hard to hold that man's future knowledge can be unfailingly predicted. It is true that, upon our knowledge achieved in the past as well as the present, we may and often do anticipate the future wherein we form a possible or the most likely picture of human existence. But man remains essentially unable to detect any set of rules that would enable him to find out any 'truth' in respect of which modification or alteration should of necessity be impossible. Hence, unshakable certainity seems impossible in any anticipation. That would be to suppose, quite unwarrantedly, that all the possible expressions of human reflectivity fall within foresee-

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able categories covred by definite rules.Indeed once we recognise the true meaning of the open character of human reflectivity, we would in no way hesitate to agree with Jaspers when he remarks: 'No one can foretell ...what men will do, what will happen due to human action. We can envision possibilities and probabilities and improbabilities, but experience tells us that the impossible can happen, that the probable may never happen, and above all that new, completely unthought-of realities may appear.'[12] He remarks further: 'We should like to be sure what will happen, but such knowledge is not for man'.[13] For we cannot foreknow what exactly would the forthcoming moments come up with. 'Each moment', as Bergson observes, 'is not only something new, but something unforeseeable; ... change is far more radical than we suppose.'[14] We must not confuse here lived-time with the abstract time of science. 'Lived-time' means time in respect of actual, consciously willing man--- and here the future cannot be made present to us because it depends crucially upon the-then man's experience and decision. Here, as Berdyaev puts it, 'time is in man, and not man in time'.[15] If so, how could we assure ourselves of any 'The system' or - 'The Level' that would remain valid for all time to come?

An attempt is sometimes made to justify an - 'absolutely perfect portrait' of man in terms of an allegedly pure 'formalised systematisation' of the human world. This 'portrait' is claimed to exhaust all that is cardinal regarding man and his world and in this sense to be the 'essential' or 'complete' picture of the same. But in view of the essential openness of human existence, any attempt to cast it (human existence) into a nice, neat, formal, axiomatic system begins to look a little forced. The formalists, however, are so eager to formalise human existence and the world that they forget that they are thereby distorting and leaving so much of our existence, that it becomes difficult to regard such

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a 'portrait' as the real representative of the same. Arguing in this line, one might say that human life as picked bare by 'formal representation' appears even less than the skeleton. For often it happens that no idea whatsoever of many vital spheres of the lived life can be had from the 'formal account'. Russell once remarked that 'the formalities are like a watchmaker who is so absorbed in making his watch look pretty that he has forgotten the purpose of telling time.'[16] The formalists might argue that, at any rate, the 'formalised' representation of the human discourse suffers less inaccuracy. But this is simply beside the issue. Whether the 'formal account' is less accurate or more accurate is another matter. The point is, no matter to whatever extent it could be regarded as an accurate representation of life and the world, it remains doubtful whether it could be treated as the final one. The formalists often take recourse to mathematics and argue that mathematical systems can be cited as examples of pure perfection. This sort of claim appears controversial after Godel has shown that any system rich enough to contain arithmetic within it suffers certain internal shortcomings in that it must contain propositions which are true but not 'provable' within that system. Godel's attack is against a central problem in the foundation of mathematics. It is with the question of adequacy of the axiomatic method. The axiomatic method consists in accepting without proof certain propositions as axioms or postulates, and then deriving from the axioms all the properties of the system as theorems. Thus the relatively small number of axioms carry the whole weight of the limitless propositions derivable from them. But it should be clear that there is no reason to accept any axiom or set of axiom as absolute. In fact, axioms are no longer regarded as absolute. When a certain proposition is nowadays called an axiom all that is meant is that the proposition is assumed in a particular system in which it affords a basis for demonstration

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although it is not itself demonstrable; it is in this sense that the proposition is called an axiom or a postulate, and not in the sense that the proposition enjoys an unfailing kind of truth. Thus it should be obvious that what is a theorem or a demonstrated proposition in one system may quite be an axiom or an undemonstrated proposition in another. This clearly strikes at the so-called system-invariant or 'in-itself' sort of indispensability of an axiom. Not only that proposition's being an axiom depends upon how it stands in a particular system, but sometimes a proposition's even being true is system-relative. Take for example the case of geometry. Beside the geometry of Euclid, there are now other geometries - that of Reiman, or of Lobatschewsky, and of many others. And there are propositions that are true in one such geometry are not so in another. Precisely for this, today's geometricians if asked whether a certain proposition is true, would immediately enquire: in which system?

Anyway, as Godel shows,[17] given any consistent set of arithmetical axioms, there are true arithmetical statements that cannot be derived from the set. One might suggest that eventually the axioms could be modified or augmented so as to make hitherto unprovable statements derivable in the enlarged system. But Gödel shows that, even if the axioms of arithmetic are augmented by an indefinite number of other true ones, there will always be further arithmetical truths that are not formally derivable from the augmented set. Such further truths may be established by some meta-mathematical reasoning about an arithmetical system. But this procedure fails to satisfy the requirements, first, that the calculus must be, so to say, self-contained, and the second, that the truths in question must be exhibited as the formal consequences of the specified axioms within the system. There is, in this way, an inherent limitation in the axiomatic method as a way of systematising the whole of arithmetic.

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Gödel's method of representation shows that neither the arithmetical formula corresponding to a certain true meta-mathematical statement about the formula, nor the arithmetical formula corresponding to the denial of the alleged statement, is demonstrated within the calculus. But evidently one of these arithmetical formulae must codify an arithmetical truth. Yet neither is derivable from the axioms. Consequently the axioms must be regarded as incomplete. Gödel's method of representation yields an arithmetical formula corresponding to the meta-mathematical statement 'The calculus is consistent', and also shows that this formula is not demonstrable within the calculus. It follows that the alleged meta-mathematical statement cannot be established unless rules of inference are used that cannot be represented within the calculus, in other words, in proving the alleged meta-mathematic statement rules must be employed whose own consistency may be as questionable as that of arithmetic itself.

The formalist sometimes tries to restore his position by taking recourse to what he calls 'the model-method'. This method consists in finding out a 'model' (or'interpretation') for the abstract postulates of a system, so that each postulate is converted into a true statement about the 'model'. It is then argued that, since the postulates agree with our actual, though limited, experience of the 'model', we are justified in extrapolating from the ungeneralised to the generalised or the universal. But such move seems unsatisfactory because of at least two reasons. In the first place, it presupposes, rather unduly, the human reality as 'organic' in the sense that, from any portion adequately understood, the 'whole' could be adequately inferred, to be sure, as it might now become clear from our discussion, no such 'already-whole' can be ascertained to be there of which we are approximating gradually. Secondly, it underrates or overlooks the basic limit of any

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reasoning inductive in character which the move itself clearly is. Whatever inductive evidence can be adduced in support of any claim, our best proof would remain logically incomplete. For, we can never rule out the possibility that, in the course of experience, a fact may appear that might come in conflict with any of the postulates upon which the claim has been made. Inductive considerations indeed can show no more than that any such postulate is probably true, however high the degree of this probability might be. We are not intending here in any way to invalidate or belittle the inductive method, since indeed it is this method that we have in most cases, if not all, ultimately to fall back upon in some way or other. But we must remind ourselves what the inductive method is all about. Inductive reasoning consists in the argument that if everything so far observed which had the property P also had the property Q, then we should assume that everything in existence which has P also has Q, and that this would in all probability continue to be the case. The argument is based on the claim that it is more reasonable to assume this kind of uniformity of nature than to assume otherwise - without ever cancelling the possibility that this uniformity may not hold. Otherwise rationality requires that we assume the unobserved cases should be observed. The limitations of the inductive method point to some basic limitations of our making conclusions about ourselves and our world. Surely we cannot be expected to sit and wait and make no observation about the future, until we are provided with a method which would enable us to do so with conclusive certainty. But however in order to live we need not have an unfailing guarentee about the future. Human life is led and is to be led upon probabilities of varying force. This aspect of human existence is mirrored in highly sophisticated domains when the present day scientists are showing an increasing inclination to regard different laws as probalistic or statistical ones.[18] The admission of

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such probabilism eliminates or at least threatens a univocal endorsement of absolutely certain laws or anything like that.

Besides 'formalised account', a review of ordinary language -- the language in and through which we lead our life, also reveals our incompleteness. Our language, to be sure, is not just a medium of expression, but rather an expression of our very being. Human language signifies a body of sounds pregnent with meanings that betoken man's thoughts and ideas. Our language is thus not external to us, not 'a ready-made cloak' (to use a phrase of Kalidas Bhattacharya[19]) for us to pick up and wear. This is not to deny the instrumental function of language. Our language helps us to 'objectify' and communicate what we encounter. But our encounters, it should be clear, are identified -- are what they are for us -- mainly through their disclosure in language. As W.Von Humboldt puts the point: 'Man lives with his objects chiefly ..... as language presents them to him.[20] Or as Peter Winch observes in a somewhat different context: 'Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use,[21] All this reminds one of Whorf', famous principle of linguistic relativity expressive of the idea that the structure of man's language influences the manner in which he understands reality and behaves with respect to it. 'It is quite an illusion', says Sapir - Whorf's teacher, 'to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially witout the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group ... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation'.[22] Human language captures the world as not simply being there, but as being significant; the world gathers and expresses its

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identity for man in and through his language. Now there is a sense in which the modes of man's being may be said to be structured to a considerable extent by what he encounters and hence to that extent by his language. If so, any incompleteness of man's language would be expressive of his own incompleteness.

The incompleteness of human language may, in the first place, be traced to man himself. Man's reflective potency, as is already noted, is not closed but essentially open. Hence, since the meanings of the items constitutive of human language stem from within man's reflectivity, there clearly can be no final shape of language.

Language may be seen to be incomplete in terms of its openness to absorb new words or pharases external to its own vocabulary, so that it (the language) becomes infinitely expansible with imported words or phrases of words. This is rather a serious point. This indicates that no given language can enjoy any continuous status quo, but is always potentially open to become restructured. This potential openness of human language does never allow man to conclude that what he at any given time grasps through language would continue to remain the case for ever, since the possibility that a new recast thereof may take place in course of time cannot be a priori ruled out.

So we conclude: the human being is a fallible, finite and incomplete creature. Not that man is yet to find out his 'essence' but that there is and cannot be said to be any such 'essence' for him to be placed in once and for all. Man is, rather, one might say, essentially an unsettled being. In the awareness of this incompleteness of himself, man comes to recognise that he does at no stage fulfil himself finally, that he is a being who is always 'to-be-made-to-be'

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(to use a pregnent phrase of Paul Ricoeur [23]). This awareness clearly saves man from being fossilised, i.e. from being inertly encapsulated into his 'present', but drives him to endeavour further, to enhance his being and existence. Man's incompleteness, thus, is another name for his becoming. Man becomes and becomes and becomes...

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ON READING MARX AS NON-COGNITIVIST AND AMORALIST

I

Richard Miller in his important Analyzing Marx takes it that Marx rejects morality as a humane basis for resolving political conflicts or assessing social institutions or practices.[1] In doing this Marx, he claims, rejects something Miller takes to be essential to morality, namely that there are norms that anyone will be committed to "who rationally reflects on appropriate arguments, accepts relevant factual claims, and possesses the normal range of emotions".. (43) In our class-divided societies, he claims, there is too much cultural diversity to expect such consensus. "Different people attach different importance to rival goods, as important for themselves and for others -- say, competitive striving as against cooperation, material income as against leisure". (43) Rational persuasion, Miller argues, will not bring about agreement here. Across cultural space and historical time there are vast differences in human response as to how it is appropriate to live.(44)

> In medieval Europe, everyone gave customary restrictions and obligations of kinship great moral weight, much more so than in the present day. It simply is not true that all intelligent normal modern people, aware of relevant facts and arguments, accept the earlier rules as morally valid in their respective settings. Nor is it true that ignorance or unreason were the basis for the older views. That Aristotle would have changed his mind about slavery if he had appreciated some fact or argument does not fit what we know about Aristotle and his contemporaries. (44)

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From considerations like this Miller, surprisingly I think, attributes a meta-ethical view to Marx. He reads Marx, without any textual evidence, as being "an implicit non-cognitivist.." (44) By this he means, again rather surprisingly, that "various central issues of social choice cannot be resolved, in his view, by the use of reason and evidence."[12] (44) That alleged non-cognitivist stance is not based, as one would expect, "on any alleged general distinction between moral discourse and statements of fact."(44) The basis for what he takes to be Marx's implicit meta-ethic is the belief that for some moral judgements, though not for all, there is no agreed factual basis for those judgements. That is there is no fact of the matter -- or so Miller claims -- that makes them true or false. Where certain moral arguments get resolutely pushed it will become apparent that our very fundamental moral commitments are non-rational. (44) If this were not so, Miller argues, Marx's "attacks on morality would be utterly unfair. For his arguments against utilitarianism depend on the denial that relevant disagreements over goals can always be resolved by rational means."(44-5)

II

It is not that Marx does not engage in argument in reasoned discourse to justify political choices. The claim isn't that he just gives expression to his feelings. His putative non-cognitivism, no more than Charles Stevenson's or Axel Hagerstrom's genuine non-cognitivism, does not rule out such arguments. (45) But it does mean, Miller claims, that his arguments "are not addressed to an universal audience, though they are addressed to a very large one." (45) Marx assumes that his intended audience will have rather similar initial sympathies and reflective desires to his own. That is Marx's expectation. He thinks that people, with such desires and sympathies, "will be persuaded by the facts he

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advances." (45) But he does not believe that this will be true of all rational informed human beings.

Miller then asks us to consider, if we find this a tenuous basis for a life devoted to public argument, can we find stronger grounds for our own commitments? Miller thinks we would not be able to find such grounds.(45)

Marx assumes -- I think not implausibly -- that people will think that it is wrong to oppress workers, to exploit them, to make children work so that with the long drudgery of their labour and with little in the way of education they become dulled and stunted beings. People, including capitalists, capable of moral response, only accept such situations as morally tolerable if they believe that if they were not so tolerated things would be still worse. Marx writes with the not unreasonable expectation that people will find these things bad and will at best accept them as necessary evils. If someone's attitudes are such that just flat out he cannot see anything wrong with stunting the growth of children, exploiting people or oppressing them, then, Marx realizes, there is not much by way of argument he, or anyone can make to such person. It is, however, at least plausible to surmise and hypothesize that people do not have such beliefs at least not just like that without some racial or class bias generating allegedly factual beliefs which will enable them to rationalize such treatment. But, if they really do, if they really just have them neat witout some factual rationalization, there is very little more that can be said by way of argument. Any proposition designed to show that oppressing people is evil is likely to have an either lesser justificatory weight or at least no greater justificatory weight than that proposition itself. Still, in not sharing Marx's attitudes and the attitudes of most of us here, it does not follow that such an outsider must be irrational, ill-informed or that we can

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show that his choices are irrational. There may not, with such immorality, be any falling off in rationality.[3] Moreover, it is not at all clear that there is any fact of the matter that can be appealed to that will show this outsider to be in any cognitive way mistaken. Non-congnitivism, Miller argues, explains why this should be so.

As I remarked, I do not think there is much of a textual basis to attribute such a non-cognitivist view to Marx or for that matter a cognitivist moral realist view either. But I do think that such a minimal non-cognitivism is at least plausible. Indeed, I am sometimes inclined toward it, and I think it would not be unreasonable for a Marxist to adopt it. But -- and this is the more vital point for our present argument -- I do not see how accepting non-cognitivism entails or anyway requires the rejection of morality or the moral point of view. Non-cognitivism, a meta-ethical view, does not add up to amoralism. This, I think, can be seen even from the way Miller characterizes the universal rationality that is essential for morality. He said, as I in part quoted at the beginning, that believers in morality hold that moral "norms are ... accepted by anyone who rationally reflects on appropriate arguments, accepts relevant factual claims, and possesses the normal range of emotions.' [(43) italics mine] However, by including in this characterization of an feature essential for believing in morals, the "possessing the normal range of emotions", he can non-arbitrarily rule out people who find nothing wrong at all in oppression, exploitation and stunting child labor. Hume and Westermarck, as well as Stevenson and Hagerstrom, are not implausibly construed as non-cognitivists. Yet all three of these philosophers could and would accept that characterization of a feature of the moral point of view. Hume, as did Adam Smith and Edward Westermarck as well, thought that we -- that is people generally -- have

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natural sympathies that do not allow us to remain indifferent to suffering, except where we are blocked for particular people or groups of people by powerful ideological pressures of prejudices. We have to convince ourselves by some form of rationalization that some hated race or ethnic group is scarcely human before we can in good conscience so distance ourselves from their suffering. Hagerstrom and Stevenson were more concerned with conceptual issues than Hume, Smith or Westermarck, but they make such assumptions as well, though they are more inclined to think that is a matter for psychological comment than for philosophical comment.

So someone who seriously asks, flat out and means it, what is so bad about unnecessary suffering, is beyond the moral net: he simply does not possess "the normal range of emotions" that go with taking the moral point of view. In arguing within morality we do not have to defend ourselves from persons who are simply indifferent to morality any more than to reason scientifically we have to defend ourselves from those who would reject all scientific canons.[4] In reasoning morally we can safely assume that normal range of emotions Miller refers to. The having of them is partially definitive of what it is to take the moral point of view. Someone who does not reason in accordance with them is not reasoning morally.

III

When Marx makes arguments concerning the political choices to be made he has, as an intended audience, those who have those emotions and the beliefs normally associated with these emotions. But in so arguing, on Miller's own characterization, Marx should be seen as arguing within morality not, as Miller avers, as rejecting morality. That these emotions are normally in place is presupposed when we reason morally.

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Given that normal range of expected emotions, Marx believes that under certain circumstances we can use objective political arguments to justify certain political choices. Given those emotions, and the pro and con attitudes that go with them, certain facts come to have a certain relevance and wight they would not otherwise have.[5] Moreover, there will along with this, be a recognition of the relevance of a careful marshalling of a social scientific theory which perspiciously represents the facts and makes it plain that there are possibilities that would not otherwise be noted or duly considered. There will also be a persistent critique of ideology to strike against ideological mystification. All these things are very much needed in political argument to justify certain political choices. But this is not the rejecting of morality or even the overlooking of morality but a reasoning under the moral net and indeed the moral net as Miller characterizes it. (43-45)

There are, of course, as Miller notes, sharp conflicts over values both in our own societies and between us and people distant from us historically and culturally. But it is crucial to try to asscertain the causes of these differences. It would seem to me more reasonable to expect, and it would seem to me a Marxist would expect, that the differences would turn more on different ideological conceptions of what the world is like, what people are like, how societies function, what can come to be the case and the like, than of their being different moral conceptions. One can, at least for people touched by modernity, safely assume that oppression is bad, that suffering is bad, that breaking faith with others and the like is bad. It is not over these matters that people are set against each other.

Against this, the following objection comes trippingly on the tongue: am I not, in making the above remarks, failing to face the really deep

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historical and cultural differences between peoples that Miller notes and that should be evident to informed reflection? Aristotle, to understate it, was no mean intellect. Yet he believed that some human beings are natural slaves. Miller does not think there is some fact of the matter that we, standing on Aristotle's shoulders, know that Aristotle did not that would have, had he been aware of it, changed his mind. There are just deep reletivities in human moral belief and conception that thwart claims to universal rationality in those domains.

IV

I do not see how Miller can be so confident that we are such prisoners of our ethnocentric moral beliefs and conceptualizations of the world. Indeed it seems to me quite improbable. Aristotle believed that there were not inconsiderable differences between Greeks and barbarians and that the barbarians were good candidates for being natural slaves, for among other things they did not speak Greek. He assumed, in assuming that, that Greek was conceptually more adequate language than 'barbarian' languages. But if Aristotle could have known what contemporary linguists know it is hardly plausible that a person of his intellect would have continued to believe that about languages. Some languages for various reasons have a more limited vocabulary than other languages. Contemporary Danish, for example, has fewer adjectives than contemporary English. But it still has the resources, through cultural borrowing and the like, to indefinitely add to its vocabulary as do all languages. There are available the syntactic and semantical resources to at least indirectly express in any language what can be expressed in any other language . We have no good grounds for thinking that there are intrinsically inferior or superior languages.

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So what other reasons would Aristotle have for thinking there are natural slaves? Perhaps the intellectual incapacities and lack of drive of some as opposed to others? But here we would have to rehearse all the old considerations that with us have by now become platitudes : we look for the causes of such general differences in different cultural and class backgrounds with their attendant differences in opportunities in education and leisure and the like. Isn't it these that are more likely to produce the significant differences than the natural differences rooted in our individual biologies and the biologies of distinct groups of people?

Couldn't Aristotle just hold up with the belief, differences in early socialization notwithstanding, that some people are just naturally dumber than others? Here, among other things, he would have to face Adam Smith's contrary claims about different socialization and the deeper challenges by Noam Chomsky and others that we have no general criteria for deciding what intelligence is or even a sufficiently perspicious concept here to give us a sense of where to look.[6] What we have is a bunch of diverse abilities and skills, acquired in different ways, in which people differ very considerably : some people are very verbal and hardly numerate others just the reverse. Someone adept at literary criticism may be at a complete loss with algebra and vise-versa. Why assume that an able garage mechanic who can quickly diagnose and fix what is wrong with an engine is either more or less intelligent than a philosopher who writes astute essays on the nature of moral belief? It is questionable whether we have any reliable general conceptions of what intelligence is and it is almost certain that we do not have a conception that is not culture and class skewed and that has sorted out the nature/nurture problem.[7]

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However, suppose that we did have such criteria and that such criteria were useful in determining who are to get scholarships, who will get in the law school or to graduate school and the like. Still, it is a very long way indeed from there to saying that some people are natural slaves incapable of running their own lives, taking part in political decisions about the society in which they live and are only fit to serve others. Perhaps people can be made into such people but there is no reason to think that they are by nature such people -- people who are -- by nature slaves or that there is a group, some race or ethnic group, who are natural slaves. By now we have the empirical and conceptual resources to prove to Aristotle, if he were here, that, that is indeed so. And if Aristotle were not convinced (something which I think is very unlikely) I do not see that we cannot establish quite objectively, that all the same, he is mistaken and that, by an appeal to the facts of the matter, and not by an appeal to what may be essentially contested moral concepts. Miller's claim is without warrant that we have nothing to say to Aristotle that would justify our claim that it is false that some groups of people are natural slaves. To think that we are so stuck here seems to me to be a rather un-Marxian and un-empirical failure of nerve.

Indeed Miller's own refusal to make Marx's case for non-cognistivism turn on an is/ought distinction or on some other allegedly logical distinction between moral discourse and factual discourse should give one pause. In arguing morally and politically, it is an open question, he avers, "just how far the limits of reason extend, just how many judgements are affected" by Marx's alleged "implicit non-cognitivism". (44) But why then is he so confident that we would just run out of reasons in arguing with Aristotle or with (say) the medieval Norse king Harold with his different conception of the claims of kinship, so that

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finally we should just run up against different forms of life which are just there like our lives and cannot be argued about? Perhaps such Kuhnian or Wittgensteinian incommensurability claims obtain, but there is no reason to think that Marx thought so and their paradoxicality turns the burden of proof on the person who would defend them. Perhaps at some point we just come up against non-rational moral commitments where no further argument or appeal to evidence is possible, but Miller has not shown where that point is or that we can expect to find such a point and not having shown those things, he has not, of course, shown that it at the point where we try morally to justify social institutions. This being so he has not made out a good case for Marx's non-cognitivism or his rejection, in the domain of the political, or for that matter anywhere else, of morality.

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NOTES

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THE THEORY OF STANDARD NAMES.

While commenting on the views of Quine regarding the 'opaque' context of the singular term- the context, that is, in which the singular term does not occur purely referentially, as the occurrence of 'nine' in, 'Nine is greater than five' is a truth of Arithmetic', in contrast to 'Nine is such that the result of writing it followed by 'is greater than five is a theorem of Arithmetic' in which we put 'nine' into purely referential position – David Kaplan observes, "It just is not enough to describe the (latter) form and say that the predicate expresses a property of numbers so that both Leibniz's law and existential generalization apply. What property of number is this? It makes no sense to talk of the result of writing a number. We can write numerals and various other names of numbers but such talk as the (latter), in the absence of a theory of standard names is surely based on confusion of mention and use."[1] The purpose of this paper is to consider the so-called theory of standard names and examine the claim of Kaplan vis-a-vis that of Quine. Interest in the nature of singular terms can be traced back to Frege and Russell. Frege in "Sense and Reference" and Russell in "On Denoting" and "Philosophy of Logical Atomism" consider the nature of such terms. The importance of such a consideration cannot be denied as it has bearing on their ontology, epistemology, logic and language. In what follows I propose to consider the views of Russell, Quine and Kaplan in that order on the nature of proper names which happen to be one kind of singular term.

I

Russell's views about proper names are quite familiar but are nevertheless important. The use of his analytical method and the Occam's Razor led him

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on the one hand to 'particulars' and on the other to 'proper names'. They are the logical atoms out of which respectively facts and propositions are constituted. He defines 'particulars' as :
Particulars = terms of relation in atomic facts. Df.
and 'proper names' as:
Proper names = words for particulars. "The names that we commonly use, like 'Socrates'" he says, "are really abbreviations for descriptions; not only that, but what they describe are not particulars but complicated systems of classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with."[2] As the example of such logically proper names Russell gives words like 'this' or 'that'. When such demonstratives are used quite strictly to stand for and actual object of sense they are really proper names. But he adds, "In that it has a very odd property for a proper name, namely that it seldom means the same thing two moments running and does not mean the same thing to the speaker and the hearer. It is an ambiguous proper name." This means that a logically proper name is devoid of all descriptive content since Russell's view was that simple particulars have no essences. In spite of this it is credited with a meaning. So its meaning has to be the particular that it signifies, just as the meaning of the simple word 'red' has to be the quality that it signifies.

Thus Russell bases his theory of logically proper names on the analogy between the role of logically proper names on the one hand and simple general expression like 'red' and on the other on the analogy between the role of logically proper names and the demonstratives. But as Pears says, "this lands him in a dilemma". If logically proper names are likened to the simple general expressions, like 'red', then they must be names of particulars which, for Russell,

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are devoid of essence, and then the question would be: How would Russell make the identity statement intelligible? Pears observes in this context, "Logically proper names entirely lack the descriptive foot-hold which is exploited by such standard names as numerals".[3] If on the other hand, logically proper names are likened to the demonstratives then they will have only contingent references. That is to say the same logicallly proper name cannot have the same referent in all the possible worlds. In this case the relation of meaning between logically proper name and its referent will not be necessary. And this, as Pears says, 'amounts to an abandonment of Russell's distinctive contribution to philosophical atomism.'[4]

How Russell will escape through the horns of this dilemma is not quite clear. The atomic proposition 'This is red' has the demonstrative 'this' as the subject term which is also a singular term, and a simple general expression 'red' as the predicate term, which is also a singular term. Does 'is' function in 'This is red' as identity or as predication? There is reason to say that it functions as predication here as in 'Scott is mortal' as against its function in 'Scott is the author of Weaverly' where it functions as identity. If it is so, how can Russell avoid the essence and the descriptive content of the logically proper name? With this question in mind let us turn to Quine.

II

Quine, like Russell, contested the claim of essentialism, in the form of mentalism and intensionalism with his behaviourism and extensionalism respectively. It should be noted, however, that Quine does not accept Russell's view about the meaning of logically proper names. He rejects, in other words, the view that the meaning of a proper name is its denotation, accepting the 'usage' criterion of meaning. Admittedly, he joins Russell in favouring reduct-

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ion of names to descriptions - 'Fa'='$(\exists x)\ (Fx.Ax)$' - but goes a step ahead in spelling out in greater details the nature of description in terms of predicates and bound variables. And he contends that elimination of names in favour of predicates and bound variables is essential for understanding how language works. But let that pass. Here we are concerned not with elimination of names but their use in sentences.

Quine distinguishes between definite and indefinite singular terms. Examples of definite singular terms are 'Leo', 'that lion', 'the lion' and sometimes 'he' and 'it'; examples of indefinite singular terms are 'everything', 'something' 'every lion', 'Some lion', and sometimes 'a lion'. As Strawson[5] remarks, "This is not merely a distinction of kind, of species within a genus. It is more like a distinction of senses of the phrase 'singular term'. Definite singular terms are singular in the primary sense,, indefinite singular terms are singular only in a secondary or derivative sense." The explanation of the fundamental distinction in role between singular term and general term in predicative position is an explanation which has to be understood as applying to definite singular terms. The position which definite singular terms occupy, when they play a certain characteristic role in predication, may also be occupied by other terms which do not play this characteristic role, but are allowed the title of singular terms just because they occupy this position., and these are the dummy or indefinite singular terms.

Regarding the basic distinction between definite singular terms on the one hand and general terms in predicative position on the other, Quine says, "The basic combination in which general and singular terms find their contrasting roles are that of predication... Predication joins a general term and a singular term to form a sentence that is true or false according

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as the general term is true or false of the object, if any, to which the singular term refers."[6] There is, thus, a distinction between the roles of definite singular terms and general terms in predicative position.

But what is this distinction? Following Strawson it can be said that the difference in the role of two terms might be held to be shown by the implied differences between the ways in which there might fail to be such an object. Thus the failure might be justly laid at the door of the general term; but only if (1) there indeed was certain object to which the singular term was correctly applied, and (2) the general term failed to apply to that object, i.e. the object to which the singular term was correctly applied. It is implied that in this case of failure the statement is false. The failure of application of the singular term on the other hand, would not like that of the general term depend on its partner's success. It would be a quite independent failure. And it appears to be implied here that the result of this failure would be not that the statement was to be assessed as false, but that it was not to be assessed for truth value at all. We will be reminded here of a similar point that Strawson makes in his polemic with Russell regarding the statements in which definite descriptions occur as the subject term. It concerns with the existence of the things denoted by the subject term. As Strawson puts it, "Singular terms are what yield truth-value gaps when they fail in their role. General terms are what yield truth or falsity, when singular terms succeed in their role, by themselves applying, or failing to apply, to what the singular terms apply to"![7] Strawson, it may also be pointed out, lays heavy stress on the identificatory function of the singular terms.

III

Turning to proper names it can be said that

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they are singular terms which are used to refer their bearers. The question that interests us is : what is the nature of the meaning-relation between names and their referents. Is this relation necessary? If so, in what sense? These questions give rise to what is known as the theory of standard names, names that refer to the same referent in all possible worlds. It is to such names that Kaplan was appealing in the above quotation to overcome the difficulties posed by Quine while considering the occurrence of proper names in the opaque context, because only the standard names are admissible as instances of variables in opaque contexts.

Kaplan in his paper "Quantifying in" restricts his attention to "names which are so intimately connected with what they name that they could not but name it." According to him such a name necessarily denotes its object. Such a relation between the name to its object is available and is based on the notion of a standard name. Kaplan[8] says, "A standard name is one whose denotation is fixed on logical, or perhaps I should say linguistic, grounds alone. Numerals and quotation names are prominant among the standard names. Such names do, in the appropriate sense, necessarily denote their denotations". He objects to Russell's treatment of proper names of persons as standard names by emphasizing the purely referential function of such names and their apparent lack of descriptive content. For Kaplan thinks that what is at stake is not pure reference in the absence of any descriptive structure, but rather the reference freed of empirical vicissitudes." As he puts it, "To wonder what number is named by the German 'die Zahl der planeten' may betray astronomical ignorance, but to wonder what number is named by the German 'Neun' can indicate only linguistic incompetence."[9] Thus there is a certain intimacy between '9' and 9, lacking between

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'the number of planets' and the number of planets, which allows '9' to go proxy for 9 in assertions of necessity.

Kaplan however, concedes that there are limitations on the 'resort to standard names.' He says "Only abstract objects can have standard names since only they (and not all of them) lack that element of contingency which makes the rest of us liable to failures of existence."

Kaplan distinguishes the descriptive contents of a name from the genetic character of the name on the analogy of a picture which shows a single person. (P.225) Those features of a picture, in virtue of which we say it resembles or is a likeness of a particular person, comprise the picture's descriptive content. The genetic character of the picture is determined by the causal chain of events leading to its production. He says that the nature of the genetic character is "user-dependent" while that of the descriptive content is "user-independent." He describes the latter as "a function of the picture-type while the former as "a function of the picture-token" (P.226) The descriptive content of a picture not only provides a link with reality by the relation of resemblances, but also determines its vividness.[10]

Like pictures, Kaplan contends, it is the descriptive content of the names that determines what if anything they denote. Thus denotation is the analogue for names to resemblance for pictures. The genetic character of a name in a given person's usage will account for how he acquired the name. It is the genetic character of the name that determines what if anything it is a name of. And similar considerations would apply to the case of proper names. Kaplan asserts, "This having a name of x, I shall later take to be essential to having a belief about

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x, and I am unwilling to adopt any theory of proper names which permits me to perform a dubbing in absentia, as by solemnly declaring "I hereby dub the first child to be born in the twenty-second century 'Newman I'."

A vivid name is a little bit like a standard name, but not much, according to Kaplan.[11] It cannot guarantee existence to its purported object and although it has a kind of inner reliability by way of one's use of such name to order one's inner world, a crucial condition of reliability—The determinateness of standard indentities—fails.

A standard identity is an identity sentence in which both terms are standard names. It is a corollary, holds Kaplan, to the reliability of standard names, that standard indentities are either true under all circumstances or false under all circumstances. But not so for identities involving vivid names. Kaplan says, "we can easily form two vivid names, one describing Russell as logician, and another describing Russell as social critic, which are such that the identity sentence simply cannot be decided on internal evidence."[12]

In his reply to Kaplan Quine observes, "The question just which of the names of a thing to count as standard for a believer z, is the open end of Kaplan's theory. He is rightly in no hurry to close it, for it is just here that philosophical significance proceeds to ramify. Already his work on this problem suggests in a sketchy way the foundation of an imposing theory of names, along lines no less relevant to ontology and the philosophy of mind as to logic a preliminary part of his problem is Neil Wilson's question how wrong a man can be about something and still be said to refer to it. The central part of his problem is, given all the man's names for a thing, to separate the standard ones from the others. I feel that Kaplan's appeal to a

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"vividness threshold" for this purpose is, for all its vagueness, much the right line, and I find his analogy of names to pictures suggestive."[13]

Let us leave the considerations of the concept of 'vividness threshold' for some other occasion and consider the ground we have covered so far. As we look back we see Russell considering 'singular terms', 'proper names', 'logically proper names' and landing himself in a dilemma. We see Quine dispensing with singular terms and stressing on predicates and quantifiers with his well-known principle, 'to be is to be the value of a variable', and the role of proper names in the so-called 'opaque contexts'. Kaplan anxious to salvage 'proper names' comes forward with his 'standard names', by comparing them with the role which the pictures play, with their 'discriptive content' and their 'genetic nature' and claiming that such standard names can meaningfully occur in the opaque contexts, since they refer the referents necessarily, and the meaning-relation between the name and the referent a necessary relation. But does it lead us away from essentialism and intensionalism to extensionalism which is claimed for it is an important question that can be merely raised at this stage.

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HANNAH ARENDT ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.

This paper is in response to Hannah Arendt's views on civil disobedience.[1] Assuming the general thesis that civil disobedience can be justified, the paper questions the analysis and justification as has been provided by Hannah Arendt. Her central contention is that civil disobedience is essentially a group action which springs from common opinion rather than common interest.[2] Arendt believes that civil disobedience is primarily American in origin and substance and that no other language has even a word for it. She further contends that only the American legal system has a chance to cope with the idea of civil disobedience[3] notwithstanding the fact that law and its disobedience are usually considered incompatible. The present paper examines both the contentions and concludes that Arendt's analysis is inadequate and her justification incomplete. The inadequacy may be due to the fact that the analysis as well as the justification has been provided while keeping only the American legal system in view.

I. Whenever civil disobedience is justified, says Arendt, it is either construed on the image of a conscientious objector who objects to the immoral content of a law or on the person who wants to test the constitutionality of a statute. The trouble, as pointed out by Arendt, is that the situation of the civil disobedient bears no analogy to either for the simple reason that he never exists as a single individual; he can function and survive only as a member of a group.[4]

Civil disobedience is usually indirect disobedience; citizens may violate those laws which they regard as non-objectionable in themselves (for example, traffic laws) in order to protest against

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other unjust laws. According to Arendt, "It is precisely this indirect disobedience which would make no sense whatsoever in the case of the conscientious objector or the man who breaks a specific law to test its constitutionality...."[5] Hence we must distinguish between conscientious objectors and civil disobedients. She further points out that civil disobedients "... are in fact organised minorities, bound together by common opinion, rather than by common interest....their concerted action springs from an agreement with each other, and it is this agreement that lends credence and conviction to their opinion, no matter how they may originally have arrived at it."[6] Arendt argues that arguments raised in defence of individual conscience or individual acts are inadequate when applied to civil disobedience.[7]

Consequently, Socrates' case falls outside the context, for his was an individual's protest. The main problem accordint to Arendt is : Here as elsewhere conscience is unpolitical. It is not primarily interested in the world where the wrong is committed or in the consequences that the wrong will have for the future course of the world".[8] Further, the counsels of conscience are not only unpolitical; they are always expressed in purely subjective statements. "When Socrates stated that 'it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong', he clearly meant that it was better for him, just as it was better for him to be in disagreement with multitudes than to be in disagreement with (himself)".[9] According to Arendt, the validity of the Socratic propositions depends upon the kind of man who utters them and the kind of men to whom they are addressed. "They are self-evident truths for man in so far as he is a thinking being; to those who don't think, who don't have intercourse with themselves, they are not self-evident, nor can they be proved."[10]

According to Arendt, the political and legal trouble with such justification is twofold. First, it

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can not be generalized; in order to keep its validity it must remain subjective. The second trouble, which is more serious, is that conscience, if it is defined in secular terms, presupposes not only that man possesses the innate faculty of telling right from wrong, but also that man is interested in himself, for the obligation arises from this interest alone. And this kind of self-interest can hardly be taken for granted.[11]

Arendt, therefore, categorically rejects that civil disobedience can ever be an individual's act. Civil disobedients can be looked upon as pressure groups and should be distinguished both from criminals, for they defy law openly[12] and use peaceful methods, and from revolutionaries, for they accept the legitimacy of the system (and hence accept the punishment willingly) but defy a particular law.[13] Such a defiance is justified when normal channels of change become ineffective and when government itself insists upon actions whose constitutionality and legality are open to doubt.

As for the problem of justification Arendt treats it in an unusual way, that is, attempting at making compatible the idea of civil disobedience with the concept of law. Now, there is a problem involved here because, prima facie, it seems that law can never permit its defiance. In a legal system the violation of one law can not be justified even if it aims at preventing the violation of another law. However, Arendt believes that American legal system can cope with the idea of civil disobedience in the sense that the spirit of the constitution accommodates it. She thinks that Lockean version of contract theory can explain the spirit of the constitution in the most plausible way. Accordingly, "the sense of active support and continuing participation in all

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matters of public interest" is the spirit of the constitution.[14] Arendt says that civil disobedients are the latest form of voluntary association and are quite in tune with the oldest tradition of the country.

II. According to Arendt, the greatest fallacy in current discussions of civil disobedience is the assumption that one is dealing with the individuals who put themselves subjectively and conscientiously against the laws of the community.[15] I think Arendt makes the contrary assumption, that is, the involvement of a group sharing common opinion is a necessary condition of civil disobedience. Let us imagine a situation wherein a citizen sincerely believes that a statute or an ordinance is unconstitutional or immoral and affects a large number of persons or a minority group. Suppose, further, the members of the minority group are uneducated and are ignorant of the losses or injustice they are likely to be subjected to as a result of that policy. In such a situation if a citizen raises his voice, acts deliberately against the law, and accepts the punishment willingly and thus protests as a civilian, what will he be called? A criminal? A rebel? A conscientious objector? If none, can he not be called a civil disobedient? What essential factor is missing here that prevents us from labelling him so except that usually no individual defies law in such a manner? Conceptually spaking, the essential element required is a person's defiance of law as a civilian (this is what the term literally means) involving his acceptance of the legitimacy of the system and hence the prima facie obligation to obey the law. (Certainly this obligation is not absolute, for it can be overridden by more stringent obligations). A person's association with a group and his sharing an opinion with others only strengthens his case when the practical aspect of the problem is taken into consideration.

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Hence, theoretically, Socrates' case needs reexamining before one declares it irrelevant or out of context solely on the ground that it was an individual's protest. Here, the idea of conscientious objector itself needs clarification. It is necessary to observe the difference between the two situations : (1) where a person who violates a law as his conscience dictates without accepting even a prima facie obligation towards the legal system of which he is a member as if he is only a free individual and not a person who has to share the responsibilities of a citizen, and (2) where a person who accepts the obligation to obey the law but feels that in certain circumstances he has to fulfil overriding obligations that his conscience dicates and hence defies it. The possibility of the latter case makes it sensible to suppose that a conscientious objector too can be a civil disobedient and the two are not necessarily incompatible as Arendt assumes. To treat them incompatible is to make the assumption that conscience and reason can never coexist. The assumption needs to be examined; Socrates' own case calls for it.

If someone asks whether a conscientious objector is right, using the word 'right' in an objective sense, the answer is 'No'. But, then, one is going to get the same answer in Arendt's own framework if the question is whether a group's defiance is right - in an objective sense of the term 'right'. And it is so because of her too formalistic approach to the problem. She writes that "their (civil disobedients) concerted action springs from an agreement with each other, and it is this agreement that lends credence and conviction to their opinion, no matter how they may have originally arrived at it". If in the case of a group's opinion it is not necessary to know how the members of the group have arrived at it, in the case of an individual too it is not necessary to know whence he has got his moral obligations or

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whether there is any such thing as conscience. Surprisingly, Arendt, accepting Puner's view, writes that "Unanimous agreements that 'X' is an evil..... adds credence to the belief that 'X' is an evil".[16] Credence to a belief and its righteousness are two different things. That unanimity on a decision is always sufficient to believe in its righteousness is itself a belief that Arendt seems to share with democrats. Though she writes that here we are dealing with organized minorities that are too important, not merely in numbers, but in quality of opinion, she nowhere lays down any criteria to judge the quality of an opinion.

Arendt finds it problematic to accept an individual's protest as a case of civil disobedience, for she finds the generalizability factor which is essential in any act of civil disobedience missing here. Again, it seems that Arendt assumes that an opinion held by an individual is non-generalizable in principle and she equates the generalizability of an opinion (as righteousness of an opinion) with the fact of its being shared by a number of persons. But the generalizability of an opinion that is evaluative has nothing whatsoever to do with its being accepted by an individual or a group; an evaluative judgement is generalizable, else it ceases to be so. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that when Socrates said that it was better to suffer wrong than to do wrong he meant that it was better for him only; so far as Socrates is concerned, he would have considered it better for every rational person. But since Socrates' was a conscientious objector's case, Arendt finds it more problematic. Conscience is no doubt subjective, but that the content of its imperatives too must necessarily remain subjective seems a dubious proposition which, I think, Arendt implicitly makes.

So far our discussion amounts to saying that the involvement of a group as a necessary condition for any act of civil disobedience is unsound. The objection that an individual's disobedience suffers from the

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inadequacy of its being ungeneralizable and subjective is untenable.

Now regarding the justification of civil disobedience, Arendt believes that the spirit of the constitution itself justifies it. Arendt, like many other defenders of civil disobedience, relies upon Lockean version of contract theory. Locke is often thought to have asserted that people have the right to disobey all those laws that violate their natural rights. But firstly, Locke justifies revolution on this ground. Secondly, for him consent to be in a society means consent to be bound by a majority decision of the society. Consequently, the status of an individual's or a group's right to civil disobedience when not supported by the majority has a dubious position in Locke. Atleast, he is not explicitly in favour of civil disobedience.

Even if one concedes the right to disobey the law, firstly, it is a moral right. and, secondly, it is necessarily in conflict with the legal system, for in all such cases the moral obligation, which itself is independent of the legal system, claims its superiority over the legal obligation. That means that civil disobedience can never be seen as compatible with law as such. Arendt herself suggests that civil disobedience is compatible with the spirit of law. But, then, the spirit of law is not law itself unless one defines law in this way (as all natural law philosophers in fact do). But Arendt does not do that for she herself realizes that "...the difficulty of incorporating it into the American legal system and justifying it on purely legal grounds seem to be prohibitive."[17] Since the right to resist is a moral right, conceptually spaking, this right can always be conceded to rational person in any legal system whatsoever. (In fact, the problem of compatibility of civil disobedience with a particular legal system becomes irrelevant here). It is not a speciality of American legal system that grants this right; any

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conception of a rational social order grants it.

The crucial thing in any justification of civil disobedience is to spell out the criteria which will help one decide whether a situation is of a nature that makes disobedience justifiable. The problem of generalizability, then, turns out to be the problem of finding out whether a particular opinion fulfils those criteria. The impression one gathers from Arendt's entire discussion is that she would like to restrict the practice of civil disobedience to the cases when a first order constitutional crisis is present.[18] But whether civil disobedience is justified when the constitution itself allows neglect of fundamental rights or minimum demands of justice remains a point to be considered. It is accidental that in America civil disobedience has arisen for very important issues of wide interest and the country has active political consciousness, with the result that a number of persons get involved in a movement. But that neither justifies a formal treatment of the problem nor proves that a group's involvement is a necessary condition. Civil disobedience may be American in origin, but now it has become a world-wide phenomenon. The phenomenon is to be understood even if it occurs in a legal system whose language does not have a word for it.

Moreover, it does not seem desirable to see a conceptual problem in such a limited context. In general, all philosophical problems are global and are to be specified when the specification becomes theoretically necessary. But, then, it is the task of the philosopher to show that the problem under consideration is of that nature.

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SOME PROBLEMS REGARDING THE IDENTITY STATEMENTS

The problem of identity statements is a very well-known problem in Philosophy. The aim of this article is to develop the Nyāya theory in this regard* and to show the similarity or dissimilarity in thought between the Nyāya philosophers and one of the most important Western philosophers, viz., Frege.

There are two types of identity statements - Non-informative and Informative. We can make the distinction clear with the following illustrations. When we say 'Rāma is Rāma' (Rāmaḥ Rāmaḥ), we are uttering a non-informative identity statement because here by analysis or by contemplation of the subject alone, we have an idea about the predicate. But when we say 'Rāma is the eldest son of Daśaratha'- ('Rāmaḥ Daśarathasya Jyeṣṭhaputraḥ') we would ponder upon its truth, unless we already know that Rāma is in fact the eldest son of Daśaratha, i.e, here, in this case, we cannot have any idea about the predicate, by mere analysis or contemplation of the subject. To put the matter in a different way - the first type of identity statements is devoid of any new information, whereas the second type supplies us with novel information. If the predicate indicates no new dimension of the subject, then the statement is non-informative and if the predicate tell something more than what is indicated by the subject then the statement is informative. The problem is - whether it is necessary to admit two types of identity statements.

For the Naiyāyikas, identity statements, like 'Rāma is the eldest son of Daśaratha' are admissible,

* Some discussion about this was initiated by Professor B.K. Matilal in paper entitled 'Awareness and Meaning in Navya Nyāya', presented at the International Conference of Philosophy, organised by Jadavpur University, Calcutta in 1983.

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whereas expressions like 'Rāma is Rāma' lack cognitive value and are thus pseudo-statements, and hence, inadmissible. This view is not shared by all. Many philosophers admit the cognitive value of non-informative identity statements. For example, Frege has clearly admitted two types of identity statements - analytic and synthetic. We would come to his theory a little later.

The Nyāya view seems counter-intutive on at least two counts .-

a) The syntactic structure of the expression 'Rāma is Rāma' (Rāmah Rāmaḥ) is like that of other meaningful sentence** the expression is not gibberish like 'Rāma and is' (Rāmah Ca Bhū). Considering the Sanskrit language we may say that it also satisfies the grammatical rule that in an identity statement, the subject term (Uddeśyapada) and the predicate term (Vidheyapada) should have the same nominal ending.

b) It appears to express a necessary truth. No one can deny that Rāma, after all, is Rāma. 'Rāma is not Rāma' would be a flat contradiction. Thus it seems that 'Rāma is Rāma' is an expression that states an incontrovertible truth — thus it has cognitive value.

Why then should we regard 'Rāma is Rāma' as pseudo-sentence that can never generate any verbal cognition?

The Naiyāikas have their own arguments and to defend their case they employ a large number of technicalities. In order to understand the Nyāya standpoint we have to get acquainted with their view regarding the construction of a meaningful sentence, which yields verbal cognition. There are mainly four conditions for the understanding of a sentence - Ākāṁkṣā, Yogyatā, Sannidhi and Tātparya. A sentence

** I am using 'Sentence' and 'Statement' in the same sense.

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is a combination of different words. These words signify certain referents. When some relation can be established between these objects i.e. referents, verbal cognition can be produced. Nyāya philosophers hold that this relation can be grasped if there is Ākāṁkṣā or expectancy.[1a] The incapacity of a word to produce without another word, an apprehension of the relation between what is signified by these words is Ākāṁkṣā.[1b] It is to be noted that the relation is not expressed by any term used in sentence. A combination of words like 'a cow, a horse, a car' is not meaningful because it is devoid of Ākāṁkṣā. Yogyatā is the absence of the incompatibility among what is signified by different words constituting the sentence.[2] Such incompatibility arises if we say - 'The gardener is watering with fire'. The utterance without delay of the words is called Sannidhi.[3] We may also say that Sannidhi is the presentation without delay to the mind, of what is signified by the words of a sentence (which generally depends on the utterance without delay.) Suppose, we take the sentence 'Bring the cow'. If one utters 'Bring' at 6 AM, 'the' at 12 noon and 'cow' at 7 PM, no verbal cognition would be possible, because there is no Sannidhi. In case of verbal knowledge, we have to take into account the intention of the speaker, which is called Tātparya.[4] If the intention is not realized, the hearer won't understand the speaker. Suppose one utters 'Bring Saindhava'. 'Saindhava' may mean salt or horse. If a person, while eating, asks for Saindhava, the hearer must understand salt by that. If the hearer understands 'horse' by 'Saindhava', he would have some cognition—but it would not amount to verbal cognition, because he lacks tātparyajñāna. Similarly a person, while going to join the war cannot meant salt by 'Saindhava' if he says 'Bring Saindhava'. So we have to understand the intention of the speaker. Generally context etc. help us to understand this intention.

Now, in any categorical sentence, there are two

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parts — subject and predicate. Informally a subject is that about which something is said and a predicate is what is said about the subject. In Nyāya terminology, a subject term is called Uddeśyapada (Visesyadyotakapada) and the predicate term is called Vidheyapada (Prakāradyotakapada). This Uddeśyapada indicates a referent (Uddeśya), and Vidheyapada also signifies a referent (Vidheya). The second referent tells something about the first. Both the referents arise in our cognition as qualified by some property. For example, suppose, we have a sentence - 'Man is mortal' (Manuṣyah Maranasilah). Here the Uddeśyapada i.e. 'Manuṣya' indicates the class of Man, which is characterised by the class property Humanity i.e. Manuṣyatva. The term 'Maranasila' is Vidheyapada, which signifies the class of Mortal beings. This class is characterised by the class property Mortality or Maranasilatva. The property which limits Uddeśya is called Uddeśyātavacchedaka and the property that limits Vidheya is called Vidheyatāvacchedaka. According to the Nyāya philosophers, in case of a sentence generating verbal cognition these Uddesyatāvacchedaka and Vidheyatāvacchedaka must be two different properties.[5] Here 'avacchedaka' means limitor or some limiting property. It may be questioned as to why this concept of 'avacchedaka' is introduced at all in this context. This introduction is quite pertinent for a knowledge-situation, as conceived by the Nyāya philosophers. An object may figure in various ways in my knowledge-situation, i.e,, its mode of presentation may differ in different contexts. Suppose we are trying to know something about Ākāśa. It may appear to me as the locus of sound or I may conceive it as a substance (Dravya) different from eight other substances (Aṣtadravyaitara or Aṣtadravyabhinna) accepted in the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika system. In the first case the property of being a locus of sound is the avacchedaka or limitor of Ākāśa, while in the second case the property of being a substance different from eight other substances

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acts as the avacchedaka. It is very important how an object appears to the knower. According to the Nyāya philosophers, in a categorical sentence if the avacchedaka which limits Uddesya differs from the avacchedaka that limits Vidheya, the sentence is capable of generating verbal cognition. If I know twice the same object in the same way, nothing is added to my storehouse of knowledge. Hence Uddesyatāvacchedaka and Vidheyatāvacchedaka must be different. If in a sentence like expression, these turn out to be identical, the expression becomes repetitive and thus would serve no purpose. Such expressions are, therefore, at best pseudo-sentences.

Now, if we accept this fifth condition, then it is obvious that the so-called non-informative identity statements are not to be treated at par with other statements. As has already been indicated, it is hard for the ordinary people to accept such a position, though the Nyāya philosophers claim that all of their views conform with common sense.

The Naiyāyikas try to defend their case strongly against the charges of the ordinary people as well as the opponent philosophers. Gadādhara, in his Vyutpattivādah, has given a detailed exposition of this. He has taken as an example the following expression - 'Ghatah Ghatah - i.e., 'The pot is pot'. The attacks and the counter attacks centre around different analyses of this expression. Let us try to follow the line of argument, which is full of technicalities.

Analysis No. I

A charge may be put against the Nyāya Philosophers in this way. If 'The pot is blue' (Nilah Ghatah) is a sentence proper, then 'The pot is pot' (Ghatah Ghatah) is also a sentence in that sense, because these two combinations of words have the same syntactic structure. Considering the Sanskrit expressions, we may say that in both sentences, the

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subject term and the predicate term have the same nominal ending. Moreover the Neo-Naiyāyikas have admitted sentences like 'The pot is a blue pot' (Ghatah Nilaghatah) on the ground that here something more is said in the predicate than in the subject. The objection runs that when we assert this sentence, we surely assert that 'The pot is pot' (Ghatah Ghatah). Unless 'The pot is pot', the pot cannot be a blue pot.

The Naiyāyikas very rightly point out that there is a difference between the status of the two sentences. This is clear from their structure and from the causes that produce them. Unless we recollect the referents of the words constituting the sentence, we cannot understand it. This differs in each pair of the two sentences we are concerned with. In the first case, when we consider the sentence 'The pot is blue', we surely have to recollect Blue qualified by Blueness. This is not a precondition for the sentence 'The pot is pot'. Similarly when we consider the sentence 'The pot is a blue pot', we have to accept as its precondition the recollection of Blue pot qualified by Blueness and Potness from the corresponding word. This is absent in case of 'The pot is pot'. Therefore, 'The pot is blue' or 'The pot is a blue pot' may be regarded as sentences generating verbal cognition, but 'The pot is pot' is not a sentence in the proper sense.[6]

Analysis No. 2

It may be said that it appeared to us that 'The pot is pot' is not a sentence proper, because we could not analyse it properly. Let us consider it from another point of view. It is a rule for the Nyāya philosophers that the cause and the effect must reside in the same locus. Suppose there is a piece of verbal cognition 'The pot is blue' (Nilah Ghatah). This cognition resides in self (Ātmā) by the relation of Samavāya, because cognition is a quality (Guṇa) of the self, and according to the Nyāya systems,

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relation of Samavāya prevails between a substance (Dravya) and its quality (Guṇa). This verbal cognition is the effect, whereas the recollection of the referents of the words constituting the sentence acts as one of the causes. It, being a kind of cognition, resides in the self. Thus the cause and the effect reside in the same locus. This is one way of explaining the relation of causation.

There is an alternative explanation which invokes the concept of Visayatā. According to the Nyāya philosophers, the object of any cognition is related with that cognition by the relation of Visayitā and the cognition is related with its objects by the relation of Visayatā. In case of a qualified cognition (Visistabuddhi) there can be three types of Visayatā - one is related with the subject (Visesyatā), another is related with what is said about the subject (Prakāratā), and the third one is related with the relation between Visesya and Prakāra viz, Samsargatā. Now, let us take the example of 'The substance is a pot'-('Ghatah Dravyam'). Here substance (Dravya) is the subject (Visesya). Substancehood (Dravyatva) is the limitor of the subject (Visesyatāvacchedaka). The verbal cognition, which has pothood (Ghatatva) as the limitor of the Prakāra (Prakāratāvachedaka) resides in substancehood (Dravyatva) by the relation of Visesyatāvacchedakatā or Dharmitāvacchedakatā. This cognition is the effect. One of its causes, viz, the recollection of substance, resides in substancehood by the relation of Prakāratā. In the recollection of substance, substance floats qualified by substancehood. So this piece of cognition has as its objects, the substance, substancehood and the relation between them. Hence, it resides in substancehood by the relation of Visayatā. Thus the cause and the effect reside in the same locus. In the same way, we can analyse the cognition - 'The pot is pot'. We can say that the verbal cognition which has pothood as its limitor of the Vidheya resides in pothood by the

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relation of Dharmitāvacchedakatā. In the same pothood resides the cause of the verbal cognition, viz, the recollection of the pot, by the relation of Visayatā. Therefore, if we accept sentences like 'The substance is pot' ('Ghatah Dravyam') as generating verbal cognition, we have to accept that the expression 'The pot is pot' (Ghatah Ghatah) can also generate verbal cognition.[7]

The Nyāya philosophers reply that these two pieces of verbal cognition have fundamental difference in respect of their causes. Similar defence has already been mentioned, while we dealt with the Nyāya philosophers reply to the first objection. In case of 'Ghatah Dravyam', for example, the recollection of Dravya from the corresponding term acts as one of the causes. But this is not required in case of 'Ghatah Ghatah'. Therefore 'Ghatah Dravyam' and 'Ghatah Ghatah' should not be explained in the same manner.

An additional argument has been given by the Nyāya Philosophers. - Suppose we have a piece of verbal cognition - 'The substance is a pot'. If we follow Analysis No.2 then we can say that this verbal cognition which has pothood (P^2) as the limitor of the prakāra resides in substancehood (P^1) by the relation of Visesyatāvacchedakatā. One of the causes of any verbal cognition is that the property that limits the prakāra is different from the limitor of the Visesya. In other words, P^2 must be different from P^1. If this condition is considered, then it is clear that 'The pot is pot' cannot generate verbal cognition, because here the limitor of the prakāra is not different from the limitor of Visesya i.e. P^2 and P^2 are identical[8].

An objection against this additional argument can be raised - The sentence 'That is pot' (Sa ghatah) is admitted by the Nyāya philosophers, as generating verbal cognition. Suppose here 'That'

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signifies something possessing Jāti or Universal (Jātimān). Here it is obvious that the universal is pothood. Then, P^1 is pothood. P^2 also is pothood. So P^1 is not different from P^2. Still the expression generates verbal cognition. How does 'That is pot' differs from 'The pot is pot'? The Nyāya philosophers would reply that when P^2 does not float in our cognition limited by any further property or P^2 does not float in our cognition limited by any other property, then and then only the former principle stands. Here P^1 is limited by Jātitva or Universal-hood. Therefore the formal rule is inapplicable here.[9] Besides these few exceptions, we have to hold that in case of any sentence generating verbal cognition, the Visesyatāvacchedaka must be different from the Prakāratāvacchedaka.

We can explain the matter in a different way also. To understand this explanation, we have to have an idea about a more extensive effect (Vyāpaka Kārya) and a less extensive effect (Vyāpya Kārya). Wherever there is the less extensive effect, there is the more extentive effect, i.e., wherever there is Vyāpya Kārya, there is Vyāpaka Kārya. But the converse is not true. It is not the case that wherever there is Vyāpaka Kārya, there is Vyāpya Kārya. For example, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, but it is not the case that wherever there is fire, there is smoke. Here smoke is less extensive than fire, i.e., smoke is Vyāpya whereas fire is Vyāpaka. Now, the causes that generate a Vyāpaka Kārya are also operative in case of a Vyāpya Kārya. For example, if we think that the presence of oxygen is one of the causal factors for the production of fire, we should take this to be one of the conditions for the production of smoke. Unless there is fire, there is no smoke. And unless there is oxygen, there is no fire. Therefore, unless there is oxygen, there is no smoke. So, the causes required for the generation of a more extensive effect are also necessary for the

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generation of a less extensive effect. Now, let us come back to our original problem of the identity statements. Suppose, we have a verbal cognition - 'The pot is blue'. Here potness is the Visesyatāvacchedaka and blueness is the Prakāratāvacchedaka. The cognition resides in potness by the relation of Visesyatāvacchedakatā. Potness is different from blueness, which is the Prakāratāvacchedaka. These objects, which are different from blueness may be innumerable. For example, - potness, pot, blue - all these are different from blueness. The cognitions which have potness, pot, blue etc., as their objects respectively, reside in their respective objects by the relation of Visayatā. In each case by the method of agreement and difference we find that the absence of blueness is acting as a cause. Now, wherever there is a cognition (C^1), which has blueness as its Prakāratāvacchedaka and which resides in potness by the relation of Visesyatāvacchedakatā, there is a cognition (C^2), which resides in some things different from blueness by the relation of Visayatā. But the converse is not true. So here C^2 is more extensive than C^1. In case of C^2 we have the absence of blueness (Prakāratāvacchedaka) as a cause. So it would be operative in case of C^1 also and we have seen that as C^1 resides in potness, which is different from blueness, the absence of blueness acts as one of its causes.[10] Again, the cognition - 'The earthen thing is a pot' - may be analysed as a cognition which has potness as the Prakāratāvacchedaka and which resides in earth-ness by the relation of Visesyatāvacchedakatā. Here, in this case, the absence of potness - i.e, Prakāratāvacchedaka, can act as a cause. But this would not be the case for 'The pot is pot'. Because there the absence of Prakāratāvacchedaka cannot be operative, since by analysis we find that such a cognition which has potness as its Prakāratāvacchedaka would have to reside in potness only by the relation of Visesyatāvacchedakatā. The absence of potness cannot function as a cause here and the

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cognition cannot be generated at all.

A side issue :- Here arises a side issue. The Nyāya Philosophers are admitting that whenever we employ any word, we are aware of some property of the object referred to by the word. This is the ground for the application of a word. If it were not so, i.e., if the words could have denoted the objects as much without having reference to any of the properties, the question as to whether the statements like 'The pot is pot' or 'The pot is a pitcher' have different cognitive value, would not have arisen. If we consider the first one to be repetitive and redundant, we have to consider the second one in the same manner. The Nyāya philosophers think that to designate an object, we require the help of some properties. Even when we use a proper name or a singular term, a property of the object designated is associated with it. It would not be too much off the track, if we discuss in the Nyāya manner something about the statements involving singular terms. The general rule that the repetitive identity statements should be discarded, is followed here also. In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system there are nine substances (Dravya) of which Ākāśa is one. 'Ākāśa' is a singular term, because there is only one ākāśa. Suppose we have a statement 'Ākāśa is the locus of sound' - If by the word 'Ākāśa' we mean nothing more than the locus of sound, then the former expression becomes repetitive and useless. But if by 'Ākāśa' we mean the substance different from eight other substances accepted in Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika philosophy, then the sentence becomes useful. Again suppose we have another sentence 'Ākāśa is a substence different from eight other substances'. This sentence would generate verbal cognition if in this case by 'Ākāśa' we mean something other than the substance different from eight other substences. Therefore, sometimes Ākāśa is designated by the property of being the locus of sound, and sometimes by the property of being a substance different from

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eight other substances. It has no fixed property for its ground for application. It is held by some Nyāya philosophers that in case of a singular term, the object indicated is identified by property called Upalaksanā. It is not to be considered as Pravrttinimitta. In order to be a Pravrttinimitta of a word, a property should be the Vācya (referent) of the said word. Not only that, it would reside in a Vācya and should feature as a Prakāra in the memory of the Vācya[11]. Ākāśatva, perhaps, is not Pravrttinimitta because it does not satisfy the definition of Pravrttinimitta. Ākāśatva is not Vācya of the word 'Ākāśa'. It is not Vācyātāvacchedaka also. Why should we not take Ākāśatva to be the Vācyatāvacchedaka? It may be that because Ākāśatva is not any single character or property. That which is the Vācyatāvacchedaka and the Pravrttinimitta must be one and not many. Anyway when we use a general word we imply the referent by means of Pravrttinimitta and when we use a singular term we refer to the object via Upalakśanā. Raghunatha thinks that Ākāśatva can function as Pravrttinimitta, because he does not accept the former definition of Pravrttinimitta, which states that one of the conditions to be a Pravrttinimitta is that the quality should be Vācya. Raghunatha thinks that even if a quality resides in a Vācya or becomes Prakāra in the memory of Vācya, it can be Pravrttinimitta[12].

Pandit Visvabandhu Bhattacaryya has suggested in his paper 'Vyaktivācaka Śabda' (presented at a seminar of Jadavpur University Calcutta in 1979) that if 'Rama' is a proper name then Ramatva consists in Tadvyaktitva. We designate an individual who is qualified by some sort of individuality.

Anyway, in order to identify an object by a word we take help of some property and this is important for our present purpose. When in a categorical sentence, the property qualifying the Visesya and the property qualifying the Prakāra

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become the same, the sentence becomes non-informative and thus useless.

Analysis of Frege's theory : In 'On Sense and Reference' Frege has also discussed something about the informative and non-informative indentity statements. He deals with the sentences involving singular terms.[13]

Let us deal with it in some details. Suppose there are two sentences-

(i) The Morning Star is the Morning Star.
(ii) The Morning Star is the Evening Star.

Both in (i) and (ii) terms are co-referential. They actually refer to the planet Venus. And if we take as a criterion that an identity statement is true if its terms are co-referential, then there should not be any difference between (i) and (ii). But we definitely feel that there is a difference between these two. Not only do we feel, they, in fact, do not say the same thing at all. The first one is a tautology, while the second one is contingent, because it reveals an empirical discovery of Astronomy. According to Frege, the difference cannot be explained in terms of reference, but in terms of the mode of presentation or sense. The Nyāya philosophers differ from Frege regarding the status of the non-informative identity statements, but it is very interesting to note that Frege's analysis of the identity statements closely resembles Nyāya analysis. Let us take the example of an informative identity statement. Both Frege and the Nyāya philosophers would admit the cognitive value of such a statement. The sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true because the object presented as Hesperus is the same with the object presented as Phosphorus. In Nyāya terminology the Uddeśyatāvacchedaka and the Vidheyatāvacchedaka qualify the same object and thus the sentence becomes true. This mode of presentation is what is called sense by Frege. Frege thinks that in order to

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identify an object by names, we have to take help of this sense. Similarly the Nyāya philosophers also think that any referring expression must be applied by means of Pravṛttinimitta or Upalakṣaṇā or simply via some property. There is a similarity in thought in case of the application of proper names or singular terms. While dealing with Ākāśatva, some Nyaya Philosophers say that it may differ from person to person and from sentence to sentence. Similarly according to Frege, it is extremely difficult to find a universal sense for an ordinary proper name in ordinary language. In a footnote in 'On Sense and Reference', Frege comments - "In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following : the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence 'Aristotle was born in Stagira' than will a man who takes as the sense of the name : the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language.[14]

It is very astonishing that the Nyāya philosophers and Frege have the same kind of analysis and explanation, but they differ regarding the status of non-informative identity statements. The difference perhaps is very obvious. Sometimes it seems doubtful whether the Fregean analysis and the analysis given by the Nyāya philosophers can be compared so easily. The language used by Frege has some stipulations of its own. Similarly the Sanskrit language used by the Nyāya philosophers has it own stipulations. Perhapas a problem related to any verbal cognition cannot be tackled without reference to the language used. The Nyāya philosophers would never agree that the relation can be expressed by any word whereas Frege's

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writings suggest that relations can be expressed via language. If there is a sentence 'The Morning Star is the Morning Star' we would not hesitate to accept the 'is' as the 'is' of the relation of identity.

But apart from the linguistic considerations, if we come back to the philosophical side — is it very easy to decide who is the winner? Even after being acquainted with so many arguments of the Nyāya philosophers we would favour Frege's attitude in this regard. We may not get any extra information from the non-informative identity statements, but that does not mean that these sentences have no cognitive value. It goes against our commonsense to accept such a position and we should say that contrary to their pronouncement the Nyāya philosophers differ from common sense at least in some cases.

Conclusion : We can suggest an alternative explanation to justify the position taken by the Nyāya philosophers. Suppose there is an expression 'Ghatah Ghatah'. It means that 'The pot is identical with itself' (Ghataḥ Svatādātmyavān). The Nyāya philosophers would agree that in this sentence if identity or Tādatmya features in the Prakāra, then the sentence would become meaningful because the Vidheyatāvacchedaka would convey something more than the Uddeśyatāvacchedaka i.e., they would not be identical. It is to be noted that here identity acts as the relation also. Now if we take the expression 'Ghataḥ Ghataḥ' as such, i.e., if the Uddeśyatāvacchedaka as well as the Vidheyatāvacchedaka are Ghatatva and identity or Tādātmya acts only as the relation, the expression would be useless. Now, let us accept it as a dictum that whenever we would find expression like 'Ghatah Ghatah' we would include identity or Tādātmya in Prakāra. Thus the expression

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would generate verbal cognition and we would have sigh of relief as it goes hand in hand with our common-sense.

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NOTES

1a. Śābdabodhecaikapadārthe aparapadārthasya saṁsargaḥ samsargamaryādayā bhāsate. - page 2, Gadadhara Bhattacaryya, Vyutpattivādah (Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, Varanasi, First Published in 1973).

2b. Padasya Padāntaravyatirekaprayuktānvayanauvbhāvakatvamākāṁkṣā - page 486, Annambhatta, Tarkasamgraha (Bengali explanation of Tarkasamgraha and its Dīpikā by Sri Narayan Chandra Goswami).

2. Arthābadho Yogyatā - Ibid, page 486.

3. Padānāmvilambenoccārṇaṁ Sannidhiḥ - Ibid, page 486.

4. Tātpratīticchayā uccaritatvarupa Tātparyajñāneca vākyārthajñāne hetuḥ - Ibid, page 441.

5. Abhedānvayabodhaśca virupopasthitayoreveti vyutpatti - page 99, Gadadhara Bhattacaryya, Vyutpattivādah (Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, Varanasi, First Published in 1973).

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7. Atha dravyatvādau dharmitāvacchedakatāsambanadhena prasiddhasya śuddhaghatatvādyavacchinnaprakāraka 'bhedānvayabodhasya ghatatyādavāpattisaṁbhavāt - Ibid, page 99.

8. Tarhi Taddharmāvacchinnabhedasambandhāvacchinnaprakāratānirupitaviśeṣyatāvacchedakatāsaṃbandhena śābdabohaṁ prati taddharmabhedasyāpi hetutāyah svīkaraniyatāya no ghato ghata ityadisthale śābdabodhapattih - Ibid, page 112.

9. ..... viśeṣyatvaprakāratvayoravacchedakatve niravacchinnatvena viśeṣaṇīye - Ibid, page 112.

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SANKARA AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS *

That Sankara advocates linguistic analysis of a sort as a means of illumination will be evident from the following passage in his commentary on the Brahma Sutras. "The comprehension of Brahman", says Sankara, "is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedanta statements, not either by inference or by any other means of valid knowledge".[1] This might easily be construed as an emphasis in Sankara on linguistic analysis as a means of philosophical enlightenment called Brahmāvagati which is the same as liberation in Advaita Vedanta.[2] And, ofcourse, vākyārtha vicāranā or consideration of the meaning of statements has a significant role to play in the entire scheme of Sankara. But it should be borne in mind that vākyārthāvicārānā in the present context means a consideration of the Vedantic statements. According to Sankara it is not merely the understanding of the explicit meaning of any sentence that gives us enlightenment. Vākyārthā here implies māhāvākyārthā, the meaning of statements such as 'That thou art', and vicāranā can be construed as analysis or a critical study where we take into consideration not only the explicit meaning (vācyārthā) but also the implicit significance (Laksyārtha) of the statement.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that for Sankara all the statements of Vedantic literature are not of the same status. Whenever there is any talk of creation or of Brahmaparināma with all its ramifications, their actual purport, according to Sankara, lies in something quite different from what they explicitly signify, viz. the realisation of non-duality or 'Advaita'. Passages speaking of parināma are signi-

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ficant according to him only in so far as they make us realize the identity of Brahman and Ātman which alone makes us free. This, ofcourse, they cannot achieve by themselves but through the help of other statements such as Tattvamasi or 'That thou art'. The latter statements, therefore, have a privileged status in Sankara Vedanta so far as Brahmāvagati is concerned. These are regarded as akhandārthakavākyas to be contrasted with samsargāvagāhivākyas. Though relational in form they simply point to an identity of meaning of the expressions used (anyonyatādātmya) When we get rid of the multiple forms created by avidyā or ignorance through an analysis of the meaning of the mahāvākyas like Tattvamasi we realise the Advaita or non-duality, the unity of all existence.

Here a significant point needs to be considered. Is it a fact that in Sankara Vedanta a mere understanding of the meaning of statements through analysis is supposed to constitute illumination? Is it our ignorance regarding different linguistic forms alone which causes misery according to Sankara? So that once clarification in this regard is achieved is there nothing else left to be known? Is Avidyā a mere linguistic error or confusion? There is some such implication to be found in the writings of some recent day thinkers[3] for whom linguistic analysis is the be-all and end-all in Sankara's philosophy. Adhyāsa or avidyā for them is nothing but linguistic confusion and consequently Brahmajñāna is reduced to nothing but a linguistic illumination through linguistic analysis. To my mind it appears that such interpretations of Sankara Vedanta with all their ingenuity and insight miserably suffer from what I would regard as the fallacy of reductionism. The author of this paper, though not so very radical in his approach to linguistic analysis in Sankara did, at one time, talk of the linguistic error and even of the 'linguistic bondage'[4] in Sankara, which alone, according to him, needs eradication and, to that extent, was guilty of

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committing the same fallacy of reductionism. Analysis, it should be admitted, does play a very significant, rather in certain context the central, role in achieving illumination. But every thing in Sankara Vedanta, I submit, cannot be reduced to linguistic analysis.

A word here regarding the recent-day interpretations of Sruti as logical analysis of meanings and Sabda as linguistic analysis.[5] Sruti or Sabda, I submit cannot be interpreted as mere linguistic analysis, for in such contexts Sankara refers to different passages belonging to the entire body of Vedanta literature and also grades them for his purpose. So some of the passages which are regarded as Sabda or Sruti are regarded as either not being conducive to illumination or possessing only figurative or secondary significance, as for example the passages speaking of creation. Moreover, Sankara in his commentary on Brahma Sutras 4.1.3. refers to a passage from Brhadāraṇyaka, viz., "Veda Avedah" and explicity speaks of the abhāva of Sruti when true knowledge (prabodha) dawns. All this will be inconsistent with the interpretation of Sruti as mere logical analysis of language. Are we supposed to understand that logical analysis of linguistic forms ceases to function after enlightenment? So the entire body of Vedanta literature was under consideration of Sankaracarya when he was spaking of Sruti or Sabda as a pramāṇa. When he was talking of Vākyārthavicārana or the analysis of the meaning of a sentence, in his commentary on Ist chapter, Ist pada, 2nd Sutra, he was referring to an analysis of the meaning of the Vedanta passages found in the body of Vedanta literature which has come down to us as Sruti or Sabda. And the entire context of his remark is not to be lost sight of in this connection. The idea was to refute the Mimamsakas who interpreated the entire Sruti as a body of injunctions (Vidhi) and prohibitions (niṣedha). Sankara wanted to point out that the Vedantic literature

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refers to an existing reality called Brahman and that the passages like 'tattvamasi' are meant to refer to this existing reality, not to any injunctions or prohibitions. So Brahman can be realized only by concentrating on such passages from Vedanta literature. That the whole of Vedanta literature is meant to highlight this existing reality which is non-dual, being identified with the very self of the enquirer, is evident from his commentary on 'Tattu samanvayāt (1.1.4). Certainly, one cannot say that illumination, according to Sankara, would follow from an analysis by itself of the meaning of any referring expression or any identity statement vis-a-vis descriptive or prescriptive statements. Even an analysis of secular statements like 'thou art the tenth' (Dasamastvamasi) or 'This is that Devadatta' (Soyam Devadattah) can lead to illumination provided they are considered along with 'Tattvamasi' etc. found in the context of Vedantic literature, which alone are regarded as mahāvākyas.

Avidyā or adhyāsa, according to Sankara, is 'atasmin tadbuddhih' i.e., to have the idea of something in something else. In the present context it would signify the idea of the self being confused with the idea of the object and that of the object being confused with the self. For Sankara the lokavyavahāra i.e., the normal transaction which is based on adhyāsa is expressed in language through such expressions as 'I am this', aham idam and 'this is mine', mama idam etc. The issue, therefore, is ontological, not merely linguistic. It is the all pervasive and deep-rooted ignorance of the non-dual reality in Sankara Vedanta which is at the basis of our ordinary transactions expressed in the form of linguistic expression such as 'I am this' and 'This is mine'. The entire confusion expressed in the form of our ordinary language is based on a deep-rooted ignorance which is regarded as beginningless (anādi), endless (ananta), and natural (naisargika). Confusion such as

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a man considering himself hale and hearty or the contrary so long as his wife and children etc., are hale and hearty or otherwise, or a man taking himself to be stout, lean, fair, mute, deaf or blind etc. are all expressions of a deep-rooted ignorance or avidyā in Sankara Vedanta. Not only this, the entire transactions of man as an agent or an enjoyer are based on this ignorance. It is true that ordinary language reflects this ignorance but this is only in case of those who take ordinary language to be revealing the nature of ultimate reality, that is to say so far as ordinary language is taken to be something more than vyāvahārika. A philosophically enlightened preson may use the same language knowing fully well that this is of mere practical value and all the while he is not misled by the distinctions expressed in the form of ordinary language. Language, therefore, does not necessarily create the illusion of which Sankara speaks, nor is it a fact that the confusion here is merely verbal. Ignorance consists in seeing distinctions where in reality there are none. Distinctionless non-dual reality has an ontic status in Advaita Vedanta and hence the error originating from distinctions should therefore be an ontological one, expressed in the form of our behaviour, normal transactions and in ordinary language. In this context it would be worthwhile to remember that Vidyā, in Sankara, is 'vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇa' or the ascertainment of the nature of Reality, not mere linguistic illumination.

Analysis is a means to eradicate this error. But unless the Advaita is realised through such analysis, mere linguistic clarification is not enough. It is, therefore, essential to make a distinction between mere understanding of the linguistic forms through analysis on the one hand and the eradication of ignorance and consequent realisation of Advaita which is effected through analysis on the other. What exactly is the difference between the understanding

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of different forms of language and the understanding that eradicates avidyā through analysis? This will be clear from the word 'adhyāvasana' which is used by Sankara immediately following the words vākyārtha vicāranā. Vacaspati Misra has very rightly explained adhyavasāna as savāsanā avidyadvāyochheda i.e., the eradication of two types of ignorance along with their tendencies. Ignorance manifests in our ordinary language and in our normal transactions not only when we regard a person as ignorant in the ordinary sense (Tūlā vidyā) but also when he has the deep-rooted ignorance (Mūlā vidyā). Both these kinds of ignorance are reflected in ordinary language and need to be eradicated through analysis. Then only there will be Brahmāvagati, which ofcourse is Puruṣārtha. If this point is lost sight of, as it has been in case of those who regard linguistic illumination to be the be all and the end-all in Sankara Vedanta, how is one going to explain Sankara's condemnation in Vivekacudamani of a Vidvān, who is learned in Vedanta, or is Vedanta nayanta darsi as Sankara would call him? When Sankara speaks of vidusah sarva pravrttyasambandhah in his commentary on Brahma Sutras, 1.1.4. the same word vidvān has been used also to refer to Brahmajñāni whose ignorance has been removed. To my mind it is very important to draw a distinction between these two types of 'vidvān' as envisaged in Sankara's literature.

The point which I want to make is that mere understanding of the logic of language, in the sense of clarifying the distinctions between subject and predicate or distinguishing between various types of discourses like prescriptive, descriptive, or referring, is not the same as Brahmajñāni. Knowledge of these distinctions is necessary but it is not sufficient. Sankara explicitly points out that even if one is intelligent, scholarly, and full of insight into the most subtle meanings of the śāstras, still on being enveloped by tamas he regards the unreal to be the

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reality.[6] Here again the implication is that knowledge of subtle distinctions of meaning is not enough. Moreover, one fails to understand how on the radically linguistic version of Advaita Vedanta one would explain Sankara's statement that the knower of the six systems of Philosophy including Vedanta is not fit for liberation whereas one who is free from the bondage of attachment towards objects alone is fit for liberation[7].

Sankara's conception of reality is derived from the criterion of unchangeability. Whatever is permanently of one and the same nature is real and knowledge about it is regarded as right knowledge.[8] Sankara's point is that there cannot be any controversy concerning right knowledge. For example, there cannot be any difference of opinion regarding the fire being hot. And the knowledge of fire being hot, therefore, is right knowledge (Samyakjñāna). Taking this clue from our ordinary conception, he builds an ontology of Brahman, the ultimate reality which never changes. And Brahmajñāna is the realisation of such unchanging reality. All those distinctions that we see being subject to change can only be regarded as fabrications of avidyā or ignorance. When ignorance vanishes through analysis what remains is the unchanging, non-dual reality. Analysis is a method by which ignorance can be removed and Brahmajñāna arrived at provided it is accompanied by all other paraphernalia such as sāma, dāma, titiksā, uprati etc, along with nididhyāsana or constant concentration on the truth which of course is not a mere linguistic one. On the other hand, it should also be borne in mind that nididhyāsana is not concentration on some ontological entity called Brahaman, because that would imply a distinction between subject and object which is not acceptable in the context of Brahmajñāna. That is why it is properly understood as Brahmānubhava or Brahmāvagati as distinguished from knowledge in ordinary discourse.

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This would be the comprehension or realisation of truth as Sankara would conceive it, whether one agrees with Sankara or not. In this way alone we can have a proper understanding of Sankara's philosophy as a comprehensive system, which was lost sight of in the maze of piecemeal linguistic analysis done by the recent interpreters. The impression that is given by such interpreters is that Sankara was concerned only with an analysis of a sort and that too the linguistic analysis of various statements. They even go to the extent of asserting that the Advaitin was talking of various structures of language and that his aim was to reveal the depth structure which is the eternal structure in contrast with the surface structure. Brahma Satyam Jagatmithya, these well-known expressions ascribed to Sankara are interpreted to mean that the logical subject is eternal and incorrigible whereas the logical predicate is corrigible. Moreover, the well-known criterion of Reality put forward by Sankara in Gita Bhasya, viz., yad viṣayā buddhih na vyadhicarati tat sat is taken to refer to an idea, not to the Reality, the interpretation given being, "that idea in our discourse which is not capable of change is the eternal or Sat".[9] But in fact Sankara here is speaking of the criterion of Reality (yad visaya buddhih), not of mere idea in our discourse, nor is there any justification for reducing the distinction between Brahaman and Jagat to a distinction of the logical subject and the logical predicate. Certainly Brahaman of Sankara was not meant to be identified with a mere logical subject. Logical subject has only a specific and restricted use in its tradition. My point is that there is a peculiar ontic reference in Sankara which cannot be eliminated, and this ontic reference cannot be adequately brought out by pointing out the role of logical subject in language. Such exclusive talks of logical subject-predicate distinctions in Advaita would not only involve the fallacy of reductionism but it would also amount to a sort of philosophical anachronism. No

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doubt Sankara does advocate illumination through analysis, but here analysis is to be taken as the analysis of akhandārthaka vākyas in so far as it is conducive to the eradication of avidyā resulting in illumination with regard to the nature of ultimate reality,, not a mere linguistic illumination. Ignorance or Avidyā is pervasive and deep-rooted and as language reflects this ignorance, analysis of language becomes necessary for eradication of ignorance. But what is important is that ignorance about the nature of reality be eradicated and illumination regarding the nature of the same be obtained--not illumination about linguistic form alone--which would constitute moksa or liberation according to Sankara.

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2. Cf. "Brahmāvagatirhi puruṣārthah".

3. Cf. G. Misra, Analytical Studies in Indian Philosophical problems (Bhubaneswar, 1971) and The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits.

4. Cf. G.C.Nayak, Lecturers delivered at Poona University in 1972 published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.I No.I, also in Essays in Analytical Philosophy (Santosh Publication, Cuttack, 1978), Chapter 4.

5. Cf. Misra, Op.cit.

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6. Cf. Vivekacudamani, "Prajñāvānāpi panditopi Caturōpystyantasūkṣmārthadṛk, Vyālidhastamasā na vetti vahudhā Sambodhitopi sphutam".

7. Cf. Ibid., "Visayāśā mohapāśādyo vimuktah sudustyajāt, Saeva kalpate muktyai nānyah Satśāstravedyapi".

8. Cf. Sankara's Commentary on Brahma Sutras, 2.1.4., "Ekarupena avasthitah yorthah sa paramartha".

9. Cf. G. Misra, The Advaita Conception of Philosophy: Its Method, Scope and Limits, P.18.

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A NOTE ON NYĀYA NOTION OF INFERENTIAL NECESSITY

In this paper I shall be concerned with only such logic, where the notion of necessity is involved in the notion of inference. It is often held that the Nyāya logic does not satisfy this description. My purpose in this paper is to show that the Nyāya theory of inference keeps enough room for such necessity which is an essential component of the notion of inference. The sense and extent of necessity, forming part of the Nyāya notion of inference, will be clearer in due course.

All systems of logic do not admit necessity in the same sense. There is a sense (i.e., modal necessity) in which necessity is not admitted in Nyāya and extensional logic.

Yet in extensional logic necessity is captured in some form. There are many ways in which one can capture necessity in extensional logic. One might say : to hold that an inferential relation is necessary is to hold that certain implicative is tautologous. Thus the inference p ∴ q is valid when the implicative P → Q is a tautology.

One again mignt say that admitting necessity of inferential relation is equivalent to admitting the impossibility of certain conjunction. Thus the reference p ∴ q is valid only when the conjunction P & -Q is impossible i.e., contradictory. Necessity in this sense is certified by the rule of contraposition. And hence the concept of contraposition is assumed to be closely connected with the necessity of inferential relation.[1]

But as Nyāya logic is not propositional logic, so one may hold that neither material implication nor contraposition is relevant here. And we cannot explain necessity in any of the stated ways.[2] Yet,

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as we shall see there is a sense in which contraposition can still be said to hold in Nyāya logic. The 'thing' logic of the Naiyāikas may be treated for our purpose as propositional logic. When we infer from the presence of smoke in the hill the presence of fire there, we can say the corresponding propositions, viz. that hill has smoke and that hill has fire, stand in the relation of material implication.[3] Let h stand for the first proposition and s for the second and thus we have h → s.[4] Then we can formulate a contraposition here also.

In the Nyāya tradition it is held that if fire is Vyāpaka of smoke i.e., if from the presence of smoke we can infer the presence of fire then on the other hand from the absence of fire we can infer the absence of smoke.[5] We may as well say that from 'it is false "that there is fire"' it materially follows that 'it is false "that there (in the same place) is smoke"'. This shows that contraposition holds here.

But some may still object that contraposition does not hold in the case of kevalānvayi [6] inference though such inference is admitted in Nyāya logic as genuine. The sādhya (which is to be inferred) of a kevalānvayi inference is such that the possibility of its absence is not admitted by the Naiyāikas.[7] So, though h→s holds in case of kevalānvayi inference -s → -h does not hold here. And therefore the contraposition (h → s) → (-s → -h) does not hold in case of such inferences. Thus the criticism against the Naiyāikas can be restated as: -- though in some accepted cases of inference the Naiyāikas can avail of the notion of contraposition yet they cannot refer to this notion to explain inferential necessity in general.

The opponent's point needs clarification. When the opponent says -s → -h does not hold in the case of kevalānvayi inference, they may have attributed to the Naiyāikas either of two different views :

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(a) The Naiyāikas do not admit -s → -h, or more strongly (b) the Naiyāikas admit that -(s → -h).

But surely, the opponents cannot attribute (b) to the Naiyāikas The point is; -s → -h is not a rule without exception in the Nyāya theory of inference, which admits as genuine kevalānvayisādhyakānūmiti. But this may or may not amount to an assertion by the Naiyāikas that -(-s → -h) is a rule without exception. Naiyāikas do not admit exception to the rule, -s → -h, in the sense that there are cases where -s & h is true. For in the case of kevalānvayi inference, the first conjunct must be false and therefore -s → -h would be true vacuously. Thus where -s is available -s → -h; where -s is not true -s → -h, only here h is not the negatum of the absence residing in the locue of -s. So we have shown, contrary to general belief, that there is a sense in which contraposition holds in Nyāya logic also.

As we have pointed out that contrapositon holds in Nyāya theory of inference and as contraposition is closely connected with the notion of necessity we can hope to find in Nyaya theory of inference some kind of necessity as well.[8] We believe that failure to find any place of necessity in the Nyaya theory of inference led people to think that the nature of inference according to the Naiyāikas is inductive. And the relation of vyāpti [9] is often translated as inductive relation.

In the next section we shall see that actually or explicitly the Naiyāikas admit only casual necessity to be involved in inference. But, if what we have said above is correct then it will not be difficult to derive or construe a corresponding necessity in propositional terms.

Let us take the standard case of inference -- the hill has fire since the hill has smoke. The rela-

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tion between the thing smoke and the thing fire, being one which allows no exception, is a necessary relation. And this necessary relation which is the basis of inference is factual in nature. This factual necessity', is not the only kind of necessity in terms of which the Naiyāikas understand inferential necessity. There is also an epistemic necessity admitted in their theory of inference.[10]

In our sense, inferrability is not a character of some sentence (i.e. the conclusion) but is a character of a thing (the sādhya or the upapādya). Yet, by this, we mean that there is certain other thing (jñāpaka or upapādaka), the knowledge of which leads to the knowledge of the sādhya. So it is not the relation between two propositions or two things, but it is the relation between two pieces of cognitions (of the same person) which is important.[11]

An epistemic necessity, it seems, is to be admitted in the theory of inference and Naiyāikas have provided for this. It is said if one has vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñāna, inferential cognition follows.[12] Certain cognitions are causally related with certain other cognitions. So, if in the same locus, a cognition of vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharamatā occurs there cannot but occur inference. And the validity of such inference depends on the validity of such vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharamatājñāna.[13]

Thus one who has the inferential knowledge that the hill has fire, can not but have previously known that the hill has smoke. To say that it cannot be otherwise is to say, in some form, that it is necessary. But this epistemic necessity has some reference to a causal necessity. The necessity which is epistemic on the one hand is causal on the other. For inferential knowledge there must be some other knowledge, say parāmarśa. And the occurence of an act of parāmarśa produces the occurrence of infern-

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tial cognitions. And these two necessities go together. Both these causal and epistemic necessities pertain to the relation between the two cognitions viz. parā-marśa and inferential cognition. But the relation in the case of epistemic necessity obtains between the cognitions qua cognition. And in case of the causal necessity it obtains between them qua things of the world.[14]

This epistemic necessity can be formulated in a different way. I start with the standard case of inference "There is fire since there is smoke". Anyone could see that our knowledge of fire results from the knowledge of smoke in case we have a prior knowledge of a relation between smoke and fire. Fire is a necessary condition for the occurance of smoke. When we say that fire is a necessary condition for smoke we mean that in the absence of fire there cannot be smoke. This shows that there is a sort of causal necessity.[15] But there is on the other hand an epistemic necessity. If something s is a necessary condition of some thing, as is the case where s and h are related as cause and effect the knowledge of h is according to the Nyaya theory of inference a necessary condition for the inferential knowledge of s. In other words just as there cannot be h where there is no s so also we can not inferentially know s where we could not know h.

But absence of knowledge of h in any of the two following senses prevents the inferential knowledge of s :

(1) knowledge of h does not occur;
(2) knowledge of -h occurs.

The second is the stronger sense, and taking this sense we can state that if we know that there is no h then we cannot have the inferential knowledge of s. In other words if anything x is the necessary condition for y then our knowledge of absence of y is the sufficient condition for absence of inferential

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knowledge of x. (Tadhetuabhāvajñānapratibadhya jāt sādhyajñānam tatsādhyānūmiti).

Thus we see that the necessity admitted in Nyaya theory of inference may be viewed both as epistemic and as factual or natural.

There is another way of explicating this epistemic necessity. That we cannot help knowing that the hill has fire (once we know that the hill has smoke) is because the opposite of it would be contrary to certain belief of ours. It is impossible to suppose or concieve that the hill from where a column of smoke is issuing uninterruptedly, has no fire. This is because, such supposition would disestablish our belief in the relation between fire and smoke. Moreover, it will go against our concept of cause and effect. Naiyaikas devise the reductio argument or tarka to show how the assumption of falsity of any (valid) inferential cognition, goes against some such or other accepted beliefs or notions.

By this necessity one cannot claim to mean universal acceptability, but one can mean atleast this: it is necessary to admit such knowledge as always true in a restricted field, i.e., within a system. And nowadays necessity is usually relativized to different systems.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. In some suitable context reductio ad absurdum can be used to prove the necessity with which the conclusion of an argument follows from its premisses. And in some classical logical systems some forms of reductio ad absurdum are allowed

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to replace the rule of contraposition showing thereby that contraposition can also be used to demonstrate the necessity pertaining to inferential relation. cf Makinsen, D.C., Topics in Modern logic (Methuen & Co. Ltd.) pp 69-70.

2. Of course 'necessity' can not be explained in terms of tautology in every branch of extensional logic either.

3. For our purpose the difference between a sentence and a proposition is not relevant.

4. The letters h and s are used here as a sort of propositional variables to be replaced respectively by statements, to the effect that the subject of inference, in question has probans (in the pressent case of inference — the hill has smoke) and statements to the effect that the subject of inference has the probandum (in the present case of inference — the hill has fire).

5. This truth is rooted in the nature of the Vyāpya — viz — vyāpakābhāvasamañādhikaraṇa vyāpya.

6. "Kevalānvayi" in Kevalānvayi inference may be understood in different ways. A standard way is to mean by it asadvipakṣa cf Gangeśopādhyāya, Tattvacintāmani (Chowkhamba Samskṛta Granthamāla-42) Vol. 2, p.1326.
An asadvipakṣa anumāna means atyantābhāva pratiyogisādhyakānumān cf. Raghunatha Siromani Didhiti on Tattvacintāmani ibid p. 1326.

7. Pratiyogivyādhikaraṇa Vrttimat atyantābhāvapratiyogitvām Bhedapratiyogitānavacchedakadharmāvattvam Va.

8. The necessity involved in Vyapti is a categorical necessity. But the problem is how do we formulate it - we can formulate it in a negative way i.e., by showing the negation of a contrary supposal. Thus by using negation, we

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can formulate the necessity involved in vyapti by negating a conjunction, i.e., -(-s & h). And an alternative formulation of this negation is an "if...then" statement i.e., h → s.

If we take it as a material conditional then only there might be certain difficulties. But these difficulties did not render construction on theories of inference impossible. So we can always express the necessity involved in vyāpti in a conditional statement.

9. Vyāpti, the relation, the knowledge of which permits the inference of the presence of one of the relata from the knowledge of the presence of the other, has been defined in various ways. The most commonly accepted definition is roughly this: the hetu h has vyāpti with s the sādhya if h is such that it cannot reside in the locus of the absence of s. cf. Gangeśopādhyāya, vyāptikancaka (Kashi Sanskrit Series: Haridās Sanskrit Granthamala no. - 64).

10. We would like to make clear what we mean by inferential necessity. By inferential necessity we take certain relation between the things that make an inference possible. And so both the relation between two cognitions and the relation between the objects of these two cognitions (the objects are hetu and sādhya in the context of inference) are involved in the Nyāya notion of inferential necessity. Between the cognitions the necessity is always causal and between the objects of the cognitions it may or may not be causal.

11. An analogous view may be found in the following passage, "logic has to do neither with relations between words and sentences, nor between calculatory shapes or sounds, but with relations between 'meanings' or 'concepts." Jorgensen, J., Lanaguage, Calculuses and logic' in Kazemier, B.H. and Vuysic, D. ed. Logic and

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language (D. reidel Publishing Company, 1962) pp. 33-34.

12. What I intended to say is that Parāmarśa is the last member in the chain of causal conditions and as such there can not be any gap or intervening condition between parāmarśa and anumiti. It is not denied that all these conditions complete a totality of conditions and the totality is to be taken as the sufficient cause.

13. To arrive at an inferential knowledge of a sādhya one must have, according to the Naiyāikas, knowledge that the hetu, which have vyapti with sādhya does at the same time reside in the pakṣa (where the sadhya is to be inferred). Nyāya term for this complex knowledge, is vyāptiviśistapakṣadharmatājñāna or parāmarśa. Such a knowledge is not admitted by all Indian thinkers. cf. Gangesopadhyaya. Tattvacintāmani (ibid) = pp. 1177-1313.

14. When we are talking of two necessities, viz. causal and epistemic we are keeping in mind two orders, the order of occurence and the order of knowing. Between the objects of knowledge the necessity is causal in this order i.e., in the order of occurence the cause comes first and the effect follows but in case of their cognition, we know the effect first and the knowledge of the effects becomes the cause of the knwoledge of the cause. This is at least true of the standard cases of causal inference.

15. This should not be confused with a definitely wrong view that according to the Naiyāikas every inference is based on a causal relation between the anumāpaka hetu and the sādhya.

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON KANT'S CATEGORY THEORY

In the present paper I propose to examine Kant's category theory in the general framework of other categorial schemes propounded by Western philosophers. My basic purpose is to show that the categorial approach to mataphysics is doomed to failure. Categories are merely make shifts or convenient devices for successful manipuplation of empirical objects. But any categorial scheme instead of revealing the true nature of reality simply furnishes distortions of it. Kant is the only Western philosopher who realized this truth but even he could not resist the temptation of using the categorial scheme for determining the nature of those things which he himself showed to be beyond the jurisdiction of categories.

The category theory has been a respectable theory in Western metaphysics from Aristotle to Strawson.[1] It states that the objects of knowledge can metaphysically be divided into a fixed number of categories. Here I shall discuss briefly the origin and classification of the Kantian categories. But my main emphasis will be on the concept of the category itself, particularly whether the categorial approach to metaphysical problem or basic fact or existence or experience is tenable. I shall show that the category theory is the main reason for the stagnation of the Western metaphysics. Actually it is a groove which has been tied to the neck of metaphysics. Few metaphysicians tried to free metaphysics from this age-old groove. But now when metaphysics is not only eliminated but also banned under the pressure of this theory, it is the need of the hour to remove this Aristotelian groove from the neck of metaphysics and give a new lease of life to metaphysics. Those who defend metaphysics accept the categorial scheme of thought and those who reject

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metaphysics also do so by showing the illegitimacy or meaninglessness of category theory. This is why the Western metaphysicians as well as the anti-metaphysicians have failed to realize that a true metaphysics of being as such is possible. So long as we remain within the circle of categorial scheme, we cannot understand the true nature of reality. Categories may be convenient devices but they do not provide us with a genuine knowledge of reality. The categorial framework gives us only one way of knowing things. It does not exhaust all possible dimensions of knowability. So I believe that a genuine metaphysics is beyond the narrow schema within which the supporters and the critics of the category theory fight their battles.

There appears to be four main theories of categories, first, Aristotle's metaphysical theory of categories, second, Kant's epistemological theory of categories, third, Russell's logical theory of types of categories and fourth, Strawson's descriptive theory of categories. But these theories of categories have been refuted by nominalists, idealists, positivists and others. There are idealists like Bradley who believes that reality is not categorial.[2] Similarly there are language philosophers like Wittgenstein who downright reject the notion of categories as a conceptual scheme of language.[3] Likewise there are formal logicians like Hempel who start with truth-functional connectives and construct and develop a systematic language of well-formed formulas which has no use of categories. In this way the pros and cons of the category theory is found in the philosophical literature of the West, which probably swings a bit favourably for the theory itself. This is why the category theory has become all too important for Western philosophy. It is thus necessary to examine Kant's view of the category theory to have a proper assessment of this theory.

Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, tries to

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show that the knowledge of the objects presupposes certain apriori forms and concepts. Without these forms and concepts no objective knowledge of things is possible. The forms are space and time through which we apprehend whatever is given to our senses, namely, the sense manifold. The concepts which make experience possible are not, however, the immediate conditions of experience. They are such that without being immediate conditions of experience, they are the necessary conditions of experience. Kant calls them categories. Kant's main purpose in the 'Critique' is to determine the origin, validity and limits of these categories.

Prior to Kant no Western philosopher, not even Aristotle, had connected his categories with any unitary principle. Kant tries to remove this lacuna by grounding the categories on the understanding. He argues in the metaphysical deduction of the categories that the understanding is the faculty of concepts. There are some concepts which are formed on the basis of sense-experience. Some concepts are formed arbitrarily. But the range of the applicability of these concepts is confined to some particular phenomena. On the other hand, there are some concepts which are genuinely universal. These concepts, according to Kant, are neither empirically derived nor arbitrarily formed. They emanate from the understanding itself. In this sense they are the concepts of the understanding. The only use that the understanding can make of them is to use these concepts in judgments. That is why the understanding is also called the faculty of judgment.[5] The relationship between the concepts and the judgment is so intimate that the concepts independent of judgment are only abstractions. What can exist independently is the judgment and not the concept. In other words, a list of the concepts of the understanding can be obtained only by examining the forms of judgment. According to Kant the understanding has two

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functions : (i) logical and (ii) real. The logical function of the understanding consists in uniting the various representations in the unity of a judgment and the real function of the understanding is to impose a synthetic unity on the manifold of intuition. In the words of Kant, "the same understanding through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical forms of judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intution in general."[6] Thus corresponding to the various forms of judgment there are the categories of the understanding. Kant divides the judgments into the four heads : (i) the quality of judgments; (ii) the quantity of the judgments; (iii) the relation of the judgments and (iv) the modality of the judgments. Each head is divided into three types. Thus the total forms of judgment are twelve and accordingly Kant furnishes a list of twelve categories. The third ctegory under each head is the result of the combination of the first two categories. Here we find clearly a hint for the Hegelian dialectic which consists of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

This mataphysical deduction of the categories has been characterized as the weakest point of Kant's first 'Critique'. It is said that Kant blindly accepted the Aristotelian classification of judgment and distorted it arbitrarily to derive a list of already prepared categories. It is further pointed out that the forms of judgment, as given by Aristotle and modified by Kant, do not yield the requisite categories. Without going into the details, I would like to point out that Kant has failed to give any satisfactory reason for selecting some of the concepts and elevating them to the honourable status of the categories. Moreover, there is no plausibility in his view that the forms of judgment are also the principles according to which the manifold

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of intuition are synthesized. It is simply the expression of his alogical commitment to certain categories for which there is no logical validity and warrant. But even if this difficulty is ignored his transcendental deduction of categories has its own difficulties.

The transcendental deduction has several aspects. Firstly, Kant discusses the need for the synthesis of the manifold and the subjective principles involved therein. Secondly, he tries to prove the objective validity of the categories in general and for this he explicates the role of the transcendental unity of apperception in the knowledge situation. Thirdly, he considers the transcendental schemata of the temporal conditions under which alone categories can be applied to objects. Fourthly, he labours to establish the applicability of the categories, derived from the forms of judgment, to the empirical world.

According to Kant the contents of intuition have no relation with one another. In order to know them as contents of an object a three-fold synthesis is necessary. The contents of intuition must be taken up in intuition, reproduced in imagination and recognised in concept. The synthesis of reproduction and recognition can be performed not by the sensibility which passively receives them but by the understanding in accordance with certain apriori principles of synthesis or categories. The synthesis of recognition implies at least potentially self-consciousness. No recognition is possible without self-consciousness. As Hintikka has put it, all knowledge is at the same time self-knowledge. In other words our knowledge of the empirical objects presupposes self-consciousness. But self-consciousness, according to Kant, presupposes consciousness of objects. Kant's argument as modified by Strawson, can be given briefly in the following manner : In order to ascribe self-consciousness to myself, I must ascribe consciousness to others. But consciousness can be

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ascribed to others if and only if I can distinguish persons from material objects. Material objects can be known only by using certain concepts. It is through concepts that objects can be identified and re-identified. An object is not merely a series of sense-contents. It must be a substance interacting with other substances in accordance with the category of causality. The upshot of Kant's argument is that without categories objective knowledge is not possible. The crux of Kant's transcendental deduction is given in the following statement of Kant; "Concepts which yield the objective gorund of the possibility of experience are for this very reason necessary."[7]

There seems to be a genuine truth in Kant's category theory in so far as experience of objects presupposes some basic concepts. But his theory of schematism and the individual proof of the categories do not seem to be satisfactory. If concepts are necessary for the knowledge of the objects, there is no need of any artificial mechanism to help their application. Similarly, even if concepts are necessary for experience, there is no reason why these concepts are the same as given by Kant. Hegel has given a number of other categories and the positivists have shown all concepts to be of the same status.

Kant's category theory has two inevitable consequences, both of which are against a genuine metaphysics. Firstly, he confines knowledge to categorised thought and categorised thought is limited to manifold of sense-intuition. It is for this reason that he makes the noumenal self and the noumenal object as unknown and unknowable. It is not surprising that he accepts the possibility of a metaphysics of sense-experience and the rest is thrown to the realm of faith. Secondly, his talk of the noumenal self and the thing-in-itself or the noumenal object is based on an illegitimate use of the categories which he manifestly confines to the phenomena only.

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It is under the pressure of the category theory that Kant retains the epistemological distinction between the subject and the object or the self and the not-self, even at the level of faith of aesthetic experience. It is again under the misleading influence of the same theory that he makes the self, the very condition of knowability, as beyond the ken of all possible knowledge. He correctly realized that the knower cannot be brought in the circle of known objects, that the self can never be realized in the objective mode, that the transcendental self is the very ground of all categorial schemes; but he fails to realize that the non-categorial knowledge is also possible and the self is known through this non-categorial apprehension or detached contemplation as Professor J.N. Chubb would like to call it.

Here a significant lesson can be learnt from the history of Indian philsophy which does not attach any metaphysical importance to the category theory and which recognizes with reservations simply logical value of this theory. Kanada started his Vaisesika philosophy with a list of six categories which was later developed into a standard list of seven categories. But absolutists like Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu Samkara and Sriharsa refuted all these categories with such powerful arguments as could not be refuted by the later upholders of the category theory. Their main contention was that every category is infected with a serious contradiction. Sriharṣa finds this contradiction in the very notion of category itself.[8]

Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist logic associated categories with conception (Vikalpa) and naming (Śabda) and maintained that reality is immune from categories as it is free from conception and naming, Patanjali the commentator of Paninis Aṣṭādhyāyi, postulated four categories for naming but Bhartrhari criticised these four categories as they were simply

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appearances of the reality. The upshot of the argument of the Indian philosophers in general is that there can be no universal class of any thing which may be termed as category. They prove that there is only one universal thing and that is existence pure and simple. And this existence defies all categorisation. So categories, if any, are only temporary structures which are raised to reach existence but which are demolished the moment the existence is reached. This is all that can be said forcefully in favour of the category theory.

In Western philosophy also each category propounded by Aristotle or Kant has been refuted. Russell himself finds that the word category is incomprehensible.[9] Although he tries to revive the category theory by his theory of logical types, yet his theory of logical types is not universally accepted and can be replaced by some other simpler logical devices like the theory of hierarchy of languages.[10]

Reality or thought or language is not a closed system. That is why it defies all categorisation. Needless to point out that the category theory is applicable only to a closed system. It is like the theory of the four castes of Hindu society. As the theory of the four castes is not applicable to a growing and open society so the category theory is not applicable to the growing and open reality or thought or language. Kant also perceived this truth when he said that no category is applicable to noumenal entities like things-in-themselves. Further, Kant also pointed out the mutual connectedness of all phenomena. So both transcendentally and phenomenally nothing can be subsumed under any category exclusive of other categories. A category is applicable to a thing which is constructed by means of its help. So every categorised object is initiated with a petitio principii.

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Moreover Occam's razor can be applied to the categories which are set up over and above classes, when the notion of classes is sufficient for explaining the objective character of thought there is no need of categories besides them. Categories are not classes but classes of classes of classes. So this notion itself is vitiated with infinite regress.

Existentially also there is no cleavage between the subject and object. Experience is a whole. It is not dichotomised existentially into the subjective and the objective which are pure abstractions. The subjective has an invariable reference to the objective and vice versa. So the very ground of categorisation of experienced objects as separate from experience itself is not available at all. Existential and phenomenological analysis of consciousness and intentionality have thus given a final blow to the category theory of metaphysics.[11]

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NOTES

1. Although there is a variety of the meaning of the word category, yet there is a sense which can be taken as inclusive of all the meanings of categories. That sense can be well described as any basic notion, concept or principle in a system of philosophy.

2. At the end of the Chapter III of 'Appearance and Reality'. Bradley has proved to his satisfaction the theoretical unintelligibility of terms and relations. He has condemned almost without hearing the great mass of phenomena. Space, time, motion and change, causation, things an individual objects and the self etc. have all been labelled as appearance and not

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reality in so far as they all are governed by the categories of terms and relations.

3. See 'The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. two, p. 54.

4. See I.M. Copi's 'Symbolic Logic', Chapter VII.

5 Immanuel Kant, 'Critique of Pure Reason', translated by N.K. Smith, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London. B. 94.

6. Ibid. B. 105.

7. Ibid A 94, B 127.

8. See Khandan Khandakhādya, Chapter IV, where in Being, Non-Being, Individuality, Causality, Universal and Negation etc., have been refuted. See also Sārivaka Bhāṣya 2.2.17. Vaiśesika theory of discrete and separate categories is untenable because non-substance categories are dependent inseparably on substance.

9. "What exactly, is meant by the word "Category" whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel, I must confess that I have never been able to understand. I do not myself believe that the term "category" is in any way useful in philosophy, as representing any clear idea." A History of Western Philosophy, pp.195-202. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London.

10. Reference to linguistic expressions rather than entities avoids a vicious circle fallacy because the hierarchy of types asserted by the theory then includes only the totality of expressions within a given language, not the totality of all entities.... But in neither case is there the simple assertion that the class of all entities comprises an infinite hierarchy of logical types" The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. two, p.50.

11 See the analysis of consciousness by Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre.

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SOME NEGLECTED PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

(1) THE FOUNDATIONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS :

I) Introduction : (a) Since the propositions of mathematics do not 'depend upon the actual concrete facts being just what they are,'[1] that is why right from the antiquity mathematics has been subjected to philosophical investigations. Philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Kant have developed their philosophies of mathematics which are known as classical philosophies of mathematics.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, however, a distinguished type of philosophy of mathematics had a field day. This philosophy is often called the foundationalist philosophy of mathematics. There are three schools of this philosophy : the logicist, the formalist, and the intuitionist. The last one, i.e. intuitionist is not strictly a foundational study, neverthless it is regarded as a school within the foundationalists.

It is not our aim here to give a detailed account of either the classical or the foundational philosophies of mathematics. In fact, we shall not deal with the classical philosophies at all. We here provide a summary view of foundationalist concept of Philosophy of Mathematics and critically examine it to bring out its inadequacies. This would provide proper background in explaining our concept of Philosophy of Mathematics.

(b) The foundational studies emerged as a response to a critical situation that developed in mathematics during the nineteenth century. The three developements which led to this situation can be distinguished: the acceptance of non-Euclidean

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geometries as mathematical theories, the introduction of infinite sets as new mathematical entities, and re-organization of the calculus in terms of the number continuum as defined by Dedekind. Since the foundational studies were specifically directed towards a solution of the problems generated by these developments, these were bound to have certain limitations when considered as a philosophy of mathematics.

But it is surprising to find that the foundationalists have made virtue of their requirements and claimed that the answers they proposed to problems which arose at a particular stage of development of mathematics as a science are in fact the problems of philosophy of mathematics. We do not propose to state the specific problems that had arisen in the development of mathematics and the solutions suggested by the foundationalists, for that is not pertinent to out objective here. Suffice it is to note here that the suggested solutions were later proved to be inadequate.

What we wish to do here is to state and examine critically the conception of the philosophy of mathematics which Russell, a leader of the logicist school has formulated.

II) The Conception : (a) Bertrand Russell - (1875-1972) was one of the leading exponents of the foundationalists. According to him every subject matter 'can give rise to philosophical investigations as well as to the appropriate science, the difference between the two treatments being in the directions of movement and in the kind of truths which it is sought to establish.'[2].

Thus the philosophy of biology, for example, will begin with the subject matter of biology, namely the living organisms, just like the science of biology itself would begin. But the science of biology is interested in classifying the living beings first into

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plants and animals and then the animals into species etc. while the philosophy of biology will explicate the concept of a living being and by means of this explication seek 'to eliminate the peculiarity of the original subject matter, and to confine our attention entirely to the logical form of the facts concerned.'[3]

(b) Russell observes that philosophy and mathematics have a close affinity because both assert propositions which do not depend on concrete, actual facts. Therefore, philosophy and mathematics will be the same in all the possible worlds while special sciences like chemistry and biology will differ according to the facts of the worlds.

Coming to philosophy of mathematics proper Russell states that while mathematics begins with numbers and derives more and more complex propositions about numbers, the philosophy of mathematics seeks to go behind the concept of a number and to form the premisses of the science of arithmetic.[4]

As an achievement of his philosophy of mathematics Russell claims that it clarified the nature of objects of mathematics. They are neither physical nor mental, but they come from the world of logic.[5]

III) The Criticism : (a) The account of Russell's conception of the philosophy of science in general and that of mathematics in particular, clearly shows the inherent shortcomings in his philosophy of mathematics. These shortcomings broadly fall into two categories : the ambiguities in the formulation of its conception and the areas deliberately left out from the scope of this philosophy.

According to Russell the philosophy of a special science has not as its subject matter the "science itself", but the subject matter of that special science. Thus, for example, in the case of mathematics, the philosophy of that science will not

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concern itself with what mathematics does with numbers but will subject the very concept of a number to philosophical scrutiny. It is argued that this view, firstly, gives room to several ambiguities and secondly, that it allows too narrow a scope of philosophy excluding from it several areas of investigation which a philosophy should legitimately investigate.

Concenring the ambiguities we note the following :

(1) It is very difficult to pin-point the facts as starting points of inquiry with which a science begins. Russell, when he began formulating his philosophy of mathematics, noted that mathematics as a science began with numbers. Owing largely to the contributions made by Russell himself, we now hold that mathematics begins with sets. One can also maintain that mathematics begins with counting.

If we accept that the philosophy of a science is the analysis of the same facts with which that science begins we will not be able to distinguish between that science and its philosophy. This is what precisely happened in the case of Russell's philosophy of mathematics.[6] The most of the tools used by Frege and Russell such as the equivalence of two sets, the concept of an infinite set etc., were already developed in mathematics proper.[7] i.e., mathematics as a 'science'.

(3) It is not proper to specify a certain set of facts as the starting point of inquiry of a science. Only after a science is developed to a certain stage, one is in a position to say, that too temporarily that such and such a set of facts is fundamental to that science. Thus upto the nineteenth century, the natural numbers, the negative integers, the rational numbers and the irrational numbers were regarded as being of the same kind. It is only when the mathematicians reduced all the other categories of

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numbers to the category of natural numbers did the natural numbers come to occupy the fundamental status in mathematics. Does Russell regard this reduction of other categories of numbers to the natural numbers a philosophical exercise or a mathematical (scientific) one? If so, on what grounds?

(4) Russell maintains that given a set of facts there are two directions of development : One is towards more complexity and the other is towards abstraction and simplicity. The former is the direction of the special science while the latter is that of its philosophy.[8] This is, to say the least, too simplistic a view of a science and its philosophy. This can be shown by considering the development of the theory of groups in mathematics. In one sense this is a development in the direction of abstraction and simplification, for a group in a structure with a single binary operation with certain properties which are obviously suggested by the properties of addition. In the other sense it is a development towards more complexity, for the theory was developed to solve the problem concerning the solution of an equation by radicals. The group theory, in this latter sense, is rightly regarded as an advanced theory in mathematics.

(b) On the other hand the areas of investigation which this conception of a philosophy excludes from its purview are also important and should constitute the field of investigation for any philosophy. We may classify these areas as pertaining to the general set of problems which are distinct from specific problems.

Russell's conception of philosophy of mathematics excludes from its analysis the mathematical theories themselves. Therefore his philosophy does not discuss the nature of the mathematical processes, the certainty or otherwise of mathematical results, the methodology and criteria of progress in mathematics, the demarcation of mathematics from other subjects

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such as physics or chemistry, the process of discovery of a new theory in mathematics and its justification in the shape of its being accepted as a bonafide mathematical theory and so on.

At the level of the inquiry concerning specific problems, mathematics totally ignores the following issues : the status of an individual working mathematician within a community of mathematicians, the nature of collaboration between two mathematicians, how a particular problem comes to be regarded as a mathematical problem, how the individual mathematician perceives it, from several alternative avenues of solving the given problem why a particular one is selected, the mode of presenting the solution of the problem and so many others.

Finally, the Russellian philosophy fails to locate the mathematical thinking in the fabric of culture. It does not discuss what is the relationship betweeen mathematics on the one hand and other facets of life on the other. Most importantly, it totally ignores the tremendous success mathematical processes have achieved in such disparate disciplines as Economics, Physics and Astronomy.

(2) TENETS OF A MODERN PHILOSOPHY :

I) The Mathematical Activity : (a) Russell regarded the subject matter of mathematics as the field of investigation for a philosophy of mathematics. We hold that it is the nature of mathematical theories and not what the theories are about should be the object of investigation for a philosophy of mathematics. Thus it is not numbers about which the philosophical discussion should centre but how mathematicians deal with numbers, what makes them classify the numbers into even and odd numbers or prime and composite should be the questions of interest for a philosophy of mathematics. When Frege defined a number as an equivalence class of sets he

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was contributing to mathematics and not to its philosophy.

Thus a philosophy of mathematics must start with an assumption that there is a corpus of theories which goes under the name of mathematics and not with a range of facts with which mathematics deals. Now the philosophy of mathematics comes into significance when the identified corpus of mathematical theories is saught to be augmented by adding some new theories; and this entry of new theories into mathematics is obstructed by a section of mathematical community.

At a given point of time how is a body of results to be demarcated as mathematics? The only ground about which no serious controversy can take place is the ground of tradition. Some result belongs to mathematics because traditionally it has been so regarded. Now the concept of a tradition is generally invoked in the context of a collaborative human activity. Therefore, a philosophy of mathematics must start from the premises that its object of investigation is the outcome of a distinguished and largely collaborative human activity which we call the mathematical activity.

(b) That the mathematical activity is a collaborative activity can be readily granted; for a mathematical result, almost in every case, depends upon several results proved by other mathematicians. But once we assume the collaborative nature of mathematical activity we have to accept the objectivity of mathematical results. Russell observes, "Some have argued that the objects of mathematics were obviously not subjective and therefore must be physical and empirical; others have argued that they were obviously not physical, and therefore must be subjective and mental ..... Frege has the merit of accepting both the denials and finding a third assertion by recognising the world of logic, which is neither mental nor physical."[9]

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Russell's quotation given above points towards anoter problem, namely, the ontology of mathematics, which we shall discuss later. For the present it is sufficient to note that the logicists agreed that the mathematical results and the mathematical objects could be rationally i.e. impersonally discussed and analysed and therefore though they had no physical existence, they led an objective existence.

This observation opens up one avenue of investigation of the mathematical activity. A mathematical result is a mental construction of an individaul mathematician. But it has an objective existence in the sense that it can be discussed and analysed without reference to the author of the construction. If so, the mental processes of the author are themselves, to a large extent, capable of being investigated without the help of psychology and mostly from the examination of the objectively set problem to which the construction is offered as a solution. This type of investigation may be regarded as the logic of mathematical discovery and as a process of analysing the mathematical activity.

(c) The objectivity of the mathematical results and the collaborative character of the mathematical activity suggest that the mathematical activity is a controlled activity. The debate between the formalists and the intuitionists is instructive in this respect. According to the formalists the new construction must be consistent with the previous results.[10] The intuitionists hold that the new element be strictly constructible from the old ones.[11]

It is now well known that the formalists failed to establish the consistency of arithmetic, which is the most basic branch of mathematics. On the other hand the concept of constructibility as has been formulated by the intuitionists is so restrictive that according to that concept many of the valuable branches of mathematics will have to be rejected.

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Therefore, the control on mathematical innovation has not been exercised, on historical evidence, by any ad hoc principle such as that of consistency of constructibility.

We find that at every stage an innovated object or a result was accepted on two grounds : the existing state of available mathematics allowed the construction of the new object and secondly, the mathematical tradition felt the need for the acceptance of the new object. This can be illustrated by taking the example of the noneuclidean geometries.[12] Thus the two influences which control mathematical innovation are the tradition and the state of existing mathematics.

II) The Mathematical Reality : (a) The objectivity of mathematical results is so overwhelming that even the author of a result is inclined to regard it more as recording of an observed fact than as his own innovation. Therefore, Hardy (1873-1945) insists that there is an external reality which is called mathematical reality and the analysis of its nature must be, perhaps, the only problem for philosophy of mathematics[13].

In the philosophy of mathematics there has been the age-old concept of platonic reality. This reality is timeless and immutable. On the other hand the intutionists' conception of a mental construction insists that before a mental construction is made, the constructed object was not in existence.[14] Our discussion of mathematical activity makes it clear that we regard mathematics as the fruit of a human activity and therefore, the platonic concept of a mathematical reality does not hold good for us.

Therefore we must regard mathematical reality as consisting of the objective thought contents of results, theories and concepts. This reality is governed by the mathematical tradition and enlivened

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by the mathematical intuition. This latest element, i.e., 'mathematical intuition' requires some explanation.

(b) By the mathematical intuition we mean a feel for mathematical objects such as concepts, theories and results. This feel is not sensory because the mathematical objects are not concrete entities eventhough they are taken to have an objective existence. The mathematical intuition makes the mathematician aware of the incongruities in the mathematical reality and enables him to innovate new elements which will dissemble and reconcile those incongruities. This intuition is internal to a person but can be analysed impersonally because the directions that the intuition suggests are not arbitrary or subjective.

An incongruity in the mathematical reality usually arises becuase the domain of truth of some proposition in mathematics is sought to be expanded. This extension is also suggested by the entry of certain new concepts into the mathematical reality. To reconcile the expanded domain with the original proposition is the objectively set problem for the mathematician.

Through exploring the available reality the mathematician gets hold of a new configuration of theories, propositions and concepts and presents it in the form of a discourse. This is precisely the character of a mathematical innovation. One can illustrate it by considering Lebesgue's theory of integration. Cauchy's proposition was that every function was integrable. Here the domain of truth was the collection of functions and at the time of Cauchy a function meant a continuous function. But later the concept of a function was extended to include functions which were discontinuous every where. Thus arose an incongruity. Lebesgue's (1875-1941) exploration of reality yielded two new

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concepts : the concept of a measurable function and that of a measurable set. Thus the new proposition emerged : Every measurable function is integrable.[15]

The innovated object then stands as a candidate for admission into the mathematical reality. Such an admission is governed by the mathematical tradition.

(c) The criteria used by the tradition for the acceptance of innovation are generally known. The innovated object stands independently of tradition because of its intrinsic value, but it is accepted by the tradition because of its instrumental value. Two criteria are used in this regard. They are : usefulness and genuineness. The genuineness in the sense that the new object must stand the tests of rigour and truth.

Thus the main elements of a modern philosophy of mathematics could be the following: the objective existence of mathematical concepts and results, the mathematical tradition, the mathematical intuition and the logic of mathematical discovery. All these elements have to be so arranged as to give a coherent view of mathematics which can also account for the relationship between mathematics and a larger canvas of life.

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NOTES

1. Our Knowledge of the External World P.190 Bertrand Russell, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1972.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, page 206.

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6. Proceedings of the Fifth Canadian Mathematical Congress 1961 Editor Rosenthall. University of Tarento Press, Torento 1965. P.198.
7. Contributions to the Theory of Transfinite Numbers by G. Cantor. Dover Publications Inc. New York (Year not given).
8. Russell op-cit. P.190
9. Russell op-cit. P.210
10. Philosophy of Mathematics. P.135 Putnam and Benacerraf (editors) Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall Inc. (1964).
11. Philosophy of Mathematics P.28 by Korner, Stephan. Hutchinson University Library, London 1971.
12. See Mathematics and Logic in History and Contemporary Thought. by Carrucio Etter. Translation by Quighy, Isabel. Faber and Faber. London (1964).

The eliptic non-euclidean geometry was actually discovered by Saccheri (1667-1733) but it has to wait for its acceptance as a mathematical theory till about the middle of the 19th century. This was because the accredited mathematical theories of 18th century could not countenance the strange results incorporated in the new geometry. By the middle of the 19th century the mathematical tradition cherished the view the the nagging problem posed by the fifth postulate of Euclid can only be solved in terms of non-Euclidean geometries.

13. A Mathematician's Apology, PP.123-24 by G. H. Hardy Cambridge at the University Press, Cambridge, 1967.

14. Intuitionism : An Introduction Heyting, A. North Halland Publishing Co. Amsterdam (1956). P.3

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15. For Labesgue's theory of Integration see Toward a Theory of Mathematical Research Programme by Hallett Michael, BJPS Vol.30 (1979) and also Lebesgues Theory of Integration by Hawkinsk Thomos. University of Wisconsin Press, London (1970).

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BOOK REVIEWS

AESTHETIC COMMUNICATION - Rekha Jhanji.

Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, New Delhi. 1985. pp viii+141. Rs. 75/-.

This is Jhanji's third book on aesthetic theory. Aesthetic Meaning which is a study of the aesthetic theories of Freud, Croce, Spenglar, and Sartre appeared in 1980. Her second book, an edited one, on Communication and the Arts was published in 1984. Aesthetic Communication is in line with the work she began in 1980. It shows a progressive development of her thoguht form aesthetic meaning to communication. In the first work, her subject is exclusively Western aesthetics, while in the present work she blends her insightful understanding of the ancient Indian aesthetic theories with her excellent command of its counterpart in the Western tradition. This is an important difference; for it brings out a radical - and to my mind, a most desirable - change in her approach to the study of aesthetics. She writes: 'Whenever I have read a history of art or of philosophy I have found that the writers do not attempt to see the cultural tradition of humanity as a single unity. They treat the Western and the Eastern traditions as dichotomous, sharing nothing with one another .... Even an encyclopaedic mind like Hegel displayed a myopic vision of treating Western Europe as the centre of the entire cultural development of the world. Seeing this I felt the necessity of viewing the cultural tradition of humanity as one whole..... I believe that the problems of human experience are one, their contexts of origin may be different... And, one can enrich one's vision by turning to the ancient past of humanity and see if that can lend any insight

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into an analysis and understanding of the contemporary situation' (p vii). This has been Jhanji's major inspiration in the present work. 'Since India has a rich tradition of art, the ancient Indians have reflected upon some of the philosophical problems pertaining to the arts with consummate finesse and dexteriti'.... And, if an attempt is made to blend the Indian and the European perspectives on the problems of aesthetics it can make a small contribution towards breaking the existing dichotomy between Eastern and Western world views' (pvii).. Having carefully gone through her book I feel that the work is a much greater contribution than the author thinks it to be. She has insight into both the European and the Indian cultural traditions, and she feels quite at home, in thought and expression, in moving with natural ease from Susanne Langer to Ānandavardhana, Bhartṛhari to Wittgenstein, Sigmund Freud to J.P. Sartre and to Vātsyāyana. Besides, she is equally good at exploiting examples from architecture, music, painting and sculpture.

The basic thesis of Jhanji's work is that the creator of art through his creation is able to communicate with beholder. This is aesthetic comunication; and it is possible because 'the work of art is a symbol (and) each of its elements... is potentially decipherable by the beholder' (p. 1). The whole book is a statement, analysis and elucidation of the conditions which make aesthetic communication possible. She devides her job into six chapters with a Preface and an Introduction. In the Introduction, she offers an analysis of the concept of an art work, the notion of symbol, and a detailed discussion of the four factors which intervene in the communication of a work of art. These factors are the attitude of the spectator, the artistic media, the historico-cultural framework of an aesthetic object, and the intention manifested in the work of art. Besides, it also includes a brief exposition of the salient theories

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and treatises of the long ancient Indian aesthetic tradition which, later on, she uses as a background material for discussing the general problems of aesthetics; problems like, the interrelationship between the various arts, the relation between art and reality, unity of a work of art, aesthetic experience, criteria for the evaluation of different artistic media.

Two features are prominent in Jhanji's work: one, her rejection of the search for a priori definitions and two, in her analyses and discussion, her unfailing eye on the art history and the actual practice of the artists. She makes no claim to furnish an essential and universal definition of the aesthetic object. Throughout the work, she has her feet firmly on the ground of art history and the changing conceptions of art and aesthetics in different periods of society. 'If one glances at the history of art, one is convinced of the futility of the search for universals' (p 3) 'the search for essences is a futile venture', she contends (p 126). Nevertheless, as a working model, she defines the aesthetic object as 'a virtual creation evoking a particular in the spectator' (p 3); and she maintains that 'the principal raison d'etre of art is its communicability' (p 4).

Among the factors which generate 'a rapport between the manifest form of an art work and its imaginative reconstruction by the beholder; (p 4) she underscores the role of the attitude of detachment from all that is mundane and pragmatic (p 4) or what the ancient Indians have called sattvam. The aesthetic experience, on her view, comes close to the mystical and religious experience because all three have the same goal: the realization of the true nature of the spirit which results in the attainment of the transcendental bliss (p 6). She does not share Kant's indifference towards the distinction between art and nature' (p 6); for, if admitted, the distinction

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has two unacceptable consequences : (1) One would never know if one has stumbled upon an aesthetic object...because, apart from the spectator's detachment, there would be no other way of defining the aesthetic object (p 6). (2) 'The whole notion of communication and rapport between the creator and the spectator would lose its meaning, with the result that the aesthetic domain could not be said to exist as differentiated from other domains (p 6).

Artistic media which render the physical dimensions of a work of art constitute another condition of the possibility of aesthetic communication. Each art medium has its own semantics - a code of communication or language. The enjoyment of art implies that one understands the rules of the particular medium and also the role which the individual artist has assigned to it in his creation. On Jhanji's view, art forms cannot be taken to be equivalent to ordinary language; and for this reason 'one can apply iconographic symbolism to all artistic creations' (p 9) in order to understand the logic of aesthetic communication. 'The work of art apart from its milieu is simply a craft' (p 9). Undoubtedly, the formal properties of a work of art make it transcend the spatio-temporal limitations; and this explains why we can, in contemporary times, respond to the ancient art. However, being sensitive to the formal properties of a work of art is not the same as aesthetic appreciation : 'it forms a part of the aesthetic experience but it does not exhaust it' (p 9). The historico-cultural elements - like mythology, theology, media, styles, and the condition of the age are equally relevant to the appreciation of a work of art.

The artists manifests his intentions in his art work. Sometimes, he states his intentions explicitly; but very often he does not; and sometimes there is the possibility of the existence of latent intentions

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unknown to the creator himself (p10). To make aesthetic communication possible, we must know what these intentions are and for this we should place the work in its historico-cultural framework and relate this history with its formal properties.

A consideration of these conditions brings out clearly two important characteristics of Jhanji's strategy to tackle the problem of aesthetic communication. One, the existence of art justifies the thesis that art is communicable. This feature follows the pattern of Kant's transcendental argument. Two, creativity in the art domain involves a consciousness of the human situation in the midst of others. 'Art is essentially a human venture and it ought to be studied as such'.

Jhanji's analysis of aesthetic perception derives from recent researches in psychology and the pragmatics of language and it also takes into account the contextual conditions in which such a perception occurs. She agrees with Mikel Dufrenne that 'our perception is not passive; it is a creative activity which chooses, identifies, and organizes our sensory experiences' (p19). On her view, all perception is the solution to an enigma (p19). Aesthetic perception is different from ordinary perception in that it is an emotive and affective response marked by originality and the attitude of transcendence of the mundane world. In short, 'aesthetic experience is both sui generis and extra mundane' (p 45). Jhanji's characterization of aesthetic perception as extramundane is quite intelligible in the sense that this kind of perception is not geared to any pragmatic or utilitarian end. But, saying that aesthetic perception or experience (she uses 'perception', 'experience', 'appreciation', and 'enjoyment' interchangeably) is sui generis is uninformative. It would be informative only if she specifies at least one individuating feature which is true only of aesthetic perception and of no other kind; which unfortunately she fails to do.

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In discussing the status of aesthetic object, she is concerned with two questions: (1) What is the differentia of an aesthetic object? and (2) How is it said to be situated in its milieu? Her answer to (1) is that an aesthetic object is different from a work of art which is a physical being; it transcends thinghood; 'very often the physical aspects of a work of art are contrary to its representative aspect' (p50). We say for example that a still life has depth, but the canvas is flat; that a Fresco has a void in the middle, but the wall is intact.' An aesthetic object is an imaginative reconstruction; by its physical nature it unfolds an autonomous world. This world, however dependent on physical categories, is not determined by it. The aesthetic object has its own criteria of evaluation and the criteria of the physical world are not relevant here (p53). Her answer to (2) is that the aesthetic world does follow the lived world (as for example in the case of the theatre) in its emotions, images, and symbols; yet 'the aesthetic domain is a domain beyond that of live life... the aesthetic object manifests the mundane world, but purged of its overwhelming involvements, it objectifies emotions' (p54).

Jhanji's discussion of the nature of symbols and the concept of meaning is crucial to understanding aesthetic communication. She posits two theses : (1) The aesthetic object is a symbol, and (2) meaning is the use of symbols. The second thesis is Wittgensteinian as applied to the interpretation of art symbols. (She uses the expression 'aesthetic symbols' as synonymous with 'art symbols' (pp 69-87). The first expression could be eliminated in favour of the second to avoid infelicity of language). She writes: 'Meaning is the use of symbols in a language game. If we understand the different uses of aesthetic symbols, we would understand the notion of aesthetic meaning' (p86). Thus, in the context of art aesthetic meaning would be the agreed participation in the

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game of aesthetic symbols (p86). She admits that pictorial and poetic symbols are essentially similar, and that aesthetic communication depends on paradigms, nevertheless, she disagrees with J-P Sartre in that 'there is no difference between poetic language and other modes of artistic communication' (p84). On her view, aesthetic symbols in order to be deciphered depend on two types of situations: first, the semantics of a particular artist - the style and technique which he employes for interpreting the reality, and secondly, the historico-cultural associations that each object reveals.

On her view, 'art is one of the facets of human life' (p89); it cannot be treated exclusively as a formal composition, autonomous and independent in itself. Artistic creativity and communication is inextricably linked to its social milieu; knowledge of relevant history and culture is essential to understanding and responding to a work of art. She excludes from the domain of artistic activity all that which is not, at least potentially, communicable or decipherable by others (p90). Freedom is indeed essential to creativity, but too much of individualism of contemporary life is 'very damaging for the communication of art' (p106). Jhanji feels that effort is necessary to bring art to every day life by harmonising appreciation of nature with technology in order to rejuvenate creativity and its communication. 'The goal of meditative practices of ancient Indians which aimed at harmonising man with the cosmos must be pursued even in our days though the means may be different. And this goal can be achieved only if we obviate hierarchical relationships which corrupt men and distort their vision of one another. Then alone we would be able to reach out to other beings spontaneously' (p109).

In discussing the status of aesthetic evaluations, she argues that aesthetic judgements are neither absolute and universal nor are they disguised inter-

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jections of personal feelings. Aesthetics is not 'a rehash of sensory preferences of various historical epochs' either. This is saying what aesthetic judgement is not; but this is not enough. She has also to tell us about the logical status and function of an aesthetic judgement, which, I am afraid, she fails to discuss in any detail.

In the last chapter, Jhanji lays down conditions for the future fruitful growth of aesthetics. Here, her tone becomes prescriptive. She writes: 'Aesthetics should go hand in hand with other disciplines related to the arts particularly the psychology and sociology of art... the researches in psycho-analysis and Gestalt psychology have opened new vistas in the understanding of artistic creativity and aesthetic perception, and sociological interpretations of art have furnished us with more comprehensive and integrated visions of the different movements in art (p125). Thus, philosophical enterprize in the domain of art should adopt an interdisciplinary approach: incorporating and using the discoveries of different disciplines' (p125). I agree with her fully. Philosophy, including aesthetics, has to go hand in hand with other disciplines in order to be fruitful and worthy. The aim of aesthetics, on her view, is to develop a general perspective based on the conclusion of these different disciplines - a darśana (vision) as the Indian philosophers call it' (p126). I am afraid, it is not clear what she means by this aim. Does she mean that the aim of aesthetics is to hone our instruments of appreciation of works of art? To my mind, her answer should be in the affirmative. In no case, however, does she seek to make aesthetics a science. For her, aesthetics remains a discipline which broadens our cultural perspective and helps deepen our aesthetic insight as well as enhance our appreciation of art.

She shows unclarity on the question of the method of aesthetics. On her view, the method of

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aesthetics would remain always speculative and conceptual' (p126). The word 'speculative' is dangerous; for 'to speculate' means 'to conjecture without having the complete facts'. But she requires that in forming and analyzing the concepts of art the aesthete will take into account all the facts that he can from the relevant sciences of history, psychology and sociology; and this requirement runs counter to her declaration that the method of aesthetics would always remain speculative. Also, she calls the method 'conceptual'. This is vague; unless she means by it 'conceptual analysis'; and I am inclined to think that this is what she really means. For, she requires that, the mathod of aesthetics will also recognize 'the futility of spinning out essential definitions of beauty and art' (p126) and to undertake an analysis and enumeration of the different concepts of aesthetics in their relevant historico-cultural contexts; and also the construction of different conceptual frameworks for the different domains of art creations. Rightly, she sounds a healthy note of warning that 'if aesthetic theories are not modified in tune with the contemporary art trends or they do not formulate new notions to explicate novel artistic ventures, they would have no relevance for their milieu. They would then become mere conceptual exercises divorced from the actual world' (p128).

In my opinion, Rekha Jhanji's Aesthetic Communication is an outstanding contribution to the study of Indian and Western aesthetics. While itself being a model, it shows light and direction for the future growth of aesthetics in the country. The bibliography appended at the end of the book is fairly exhaustive. However, if one wishes to know the author's other writings on the subject, one draws a blank. I wish, she had included in the bibligraphy a reference to her other works on aesthetic theory.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems: Essays is memory of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel

Asa Kasher, ed. Boston Studies in the philosophy of science, 43. Synthese Library, 89. Dordrecht, Netherlands : Reidel,. 1977. xxviii; 679; hardbound and paperback issues.

What was to be a joyous felicitation volume on his 60th birthday turned out to be a mourning memorial volume to Bar-Hillel (1915-1975), who fortunately knew about the forthcoming volume. Bar-Hillel's interests were many, information storage and retrieval, mechanical translation, methodology of science and so on. But the decision to focus the volume on language was a wise one. It includes personal tributes from Chomsky (who was Bar-Hillel's young protégé once), Quine and others, a 100-item bibliography of his scholarly writings in Hebrew, English etc.,28 papers; and an index of names. The papers are grouped under the following heads: Reference and predication; Truth and meaning; Pragmatics, Methodological studies; Language varieties; Formalization; Points of view. The volume is truly worthy of the scholar it is dedicated to and this makes the reviewer's talk both easy and difficult.

When the present reviewer first came across Bar-Hillel's two brilliant papers, 'A Quasi-arithmatical notation for syntactic description' (Language 1953) and 'Logical syntax and semantics' (Language 1954) they opened up to his student-mind the vista of logic, semiotics, and philosophy beyond the confines of linguistics. It is a pleasure to take this opportunity to record his intellectual debt to this fine scholar, scientist, and intellectual of Israel. (Born in Vienna, he came to Palestine in 1933 and paid frequent visits to the United States in the 1950s and 1960s on research or teaching assignments.)

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As Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman said on another occasion (justifying a seminar of philosophers and linguists at Stanford in 1969), "the success of linguistics in treating natural languages as formal syntactic has aroused the interest of a number of linguists in a parallel or related development of semantics. For the most part quite independently, many philosophers and logicians* have recently been applying formal semantic methods to structures increasingly like natural languages.... philosophers and linguists are converging it seems, on a common set of interrelated problems." The present volume reflects not merely this joint concern on the part of logician-philosophers and logician-linguists to develop formal syntactics and formal semantics but also a concern for the remaining member of the semiotic triad, namely, formal pragmatics which is only now coming into its own. A better tribute couldn't have been conceived to Bar-Hillel's role in bringing philosophers and linguists together onto the common ground of a formal semiotic of natural language.

In their scope the papers differ a good deal -- some are wide-ranging or highly theoretical papers, some are very specific applications or case studies, yet others are in between. In their mode of presentation some draw upon ordinary language for their examples as well as formulations and thus less technical, some use a good deal of symbolic logic for both these purpose, yet others are in between.

An interesting trend seen especially in the papers relating to semantics and logic is an alignment based on a pair of opposite tendencies. Let's call them I and II. Blaise Pascal gave them the evocative names -- esprit de géometrie (I) and esprit de finesse (III). Similarly psychological in spirit is

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* One may point out parenthetically that what motivated them was Rudolf Carnap's insight that to do scientific philosophy one has to work out the logic of language.

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William James's distinction between tough-minded (I) and tender-minded (II) philosophies. But perhaps it is unphilosophical to look upon this simply as a matter of temperament rather than as a matter of philosophical decision. Tendency I tends to be reductionist, sceptical, and base itself upon observable, uninterpreted, bare actualities. It is likely to make friends with empiricism. Tendency II tends to be phenomenological in that it does not shirk giving logical status to the "face values" that men assign to entities and relations and that are often reflected in ordinary language usage. It is likely to make friends with rationalism, except that one does not have to subscribe to the aprioristic doctrine of innate ideas in order to be an adherent of Tendency II.

One can briefly illustrate these two tendencies with reference to some recurring problems :

Identity (papers by Ayer, Katz): Is 'be identical with' a logical, de dictu predicate or a material, de re predicate? And how do we understand identity anyway?

Implication (paper by Stalnaker): When implication is a logical predicate, is it simply 'material implication' or rather (what is more satisfying intuitively) entailment? Entailment is obviously a richer notion than material implication; how rich can we make it and get away with it?

Categorical predicability (paper by Sommers) and the closely related notion of presupposition (paper by Herzberger): Do we need 'presuppose' as a subtype of 'entail' at all? If we need it because of ineradicable truth-value gaps, do we introduce it (and categorical predicability) in a gingerly way with great reluctance or do we even leave room for unformulated or even unformulable presuppositions?

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Substance (substratum) and property (papers by Walther & Zemach, Glouberman): Do we need to recognize two kinds of predicates -- the nounish substance predicates or the adjectivish property predicates -- with only bare referent symbols or do we make do with only one kind of predicate and accept two kinds of arguments (or subjects), nouny ones and pronouny ones?

One can go like this down the list: relation (more 'externally' conceived or more 'internally' conceived), negation, existence, quotation, and so on. But the question that is increasingly being brought up nowadays is : do we have to reconcile ourselves with the existence of these two tendencies, shrug our shoulders, and doggedly continue with these presumably resolvable debates? Alternatively, one can look upon the tendencies not as 'ultimate' choices but 'contingent' policy decisions. If the latter is the case, what are they contingent on? On philosophical temperament (ā La Pascal and James)? Or do we bring in pragmatics to resolve the problems of semantics as earlier semantics was brought in to resolve the problems of syntactics (logic)? What insights can linguistics offer in this regard? (Of course some of the papers in this volume such as those by Herzberser, Cohen, Kutschera entertain these questions seriously.)

Finally, there are some good papers (by Agassi, Ranate Bartsch, Weiler, for example) which touch upon aspects of the philosophy of language not covered by this tension between Tendency I and Tendency II.

One can't think of a better volume to make one aware of some of the insistent current debates in the area of the Philosophy of Language.

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BOOK RECEIVED

1. Beyond Absurdity ; Rober C. Trundle & Ramkrisna Pulagandale, University Press of America, First Edition 1986 : pp. 124.

2. Chilly Sauce : Thomas Vellilam Thadam, Oriental Institute Publication, Kottayam, First Edition, 1984 pp. 71, Rs. 10/-.

3. From the Burning Sands : Thomas Vellilam Thadam, Oriental Institute Publication, Kottayam, First Edition, 1986, pp. 76, Rs. 10/-.

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4. Maya Gallop : Thomas Vellilam Thadam, Oriental Institute Publication, Kottayam, First Edition, 1984, pp. 76, Rs. 10/-.

5. Maya Oasis : Thomas Vellilam Thadam, Oriental Institute Publication, Kottayam, First Edition, 1984, pp. 72, Rs.10/-.

6. Maya Safari : Thomas Vellilam Thadam, Oriental Institute Publication, Kottayam, First Edition, 1984, pp. 71, Rs. 10/-.

7. God Revealed : P.J. Parikh, 10, Sujata Society, Gotri Road, Baroda, First Edition, 1985, pp. 65.

8. Perception : B.K. Matilal, Oxford University Press, Bombay, First Edition 1986, pp. 438, Rs. 175/-.

9. MM. Professor Kuppuswami Sastri Birth Centenary Commemoration Volume, Part II, ed. by Dr. S.S. Janaki. The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, First Edition 1985, pp.320, Rs. 95/-

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

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

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